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NAVIGATING THE LAWYERING MINEFIELD OF
INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND*
I. INTRODUCTION
ORGANIZATIONS of all types conduct internal investigations into awide range of alleged misconduct and as a result of information
originating from a variety of sources.  For example, corporations may con-
duct internal investigations in response to allegations of potential criminal
conduct, financial wrongdoing, regulatory breaches, or improper or un-
lawful business practices raised by auditors, whistleblowers, plaintiffs in
civil litigation, government agencies, vendors, clients or customers, com-
petitors, or the media.  Companies investigate alleged workplace discrimi-
nation or harassment as a result of employee complaints.  Nonprofit
organizations investigate alleged financial improprieties by their execu-
tives and volunteer leaders.  Colleges and universities probe reports of mis-
conduct by faculty, staff, and students which, if borne out, might violate
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.1  The list of possible inter-
nal investigation actors, circumstances, and subjects goes on.  Often, orga-
nizations publicly accused of wrongdoing swiftly announce internal
investigations in efforts to blunt criticism and signal the seriousness with
which they take the allegations.2  Indeed, the announcement of an inter-
nal investigation is almost reflexive for organizations that are the subject
of public allegations of misconduct.  Regardless of the precise circum-
* Managing Director, Aon Professional Services, Overland Park, Kansas.  J.D.,
University of Kansas.  All opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.
1. “Title IX protects people from discrimination based on sex in education
programs or activities that receive Federal financial assistance.” U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX AND SEX DISCRIMINATION, https://
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/C55W-
WVUD] (last visited Sep. 7, 2018).
2. See, e.g., Jack Stripling, At Southern Cal, It Looked Like the End of a Presidency—
and It Was, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 8, 2018, at A20, A21 (stating that USC was
forming a special committee and hiring outside counsel to investigate the univer-
sity’s failure to respond to repeated reports of sexual harassment and misconduct
by a campus physician); David Gelles, A Powerful Charity’s Toxic Culture, N.Y. TIMES,
May 13, 2018, Sunday Bus., at 1, 4 (reporting that a prominent Silicon Valley char-
ity hired an outside law firm to investigate the charity’s workplace soon after the
publication of an article reporting that a key executive regularly bullied and
demeaned colleagues, made  racially and sexually offensive comments, and
threatened physical violence); Maya Salam, Videos of Exercise at Cheer Camp Prompt
Dismissal and Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2017, at 17 (responding to allega-
tions that girls at a high school cheerleading camp had been forced to do painful
“splits” by their coach and teammates, the Denver Public Schools superintendent
swiftly announced that the coach had been fired “and that an outside law firm had
been hired to investigate”).
(617)
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stances, the stakes in these investigations are high for the individuals
whose conduct is scrutinized, for the directors, executives, managers, or
other leaders on whose watch the potential misconduct allegedly oc-
curred, and for the organizations themselves.
Organizations that have identified the need for an internal investiga-
tion typically hire outside lawyers to conduct the investigation.  They may
do so because retaining outside counsel will provide a measure of inde-
pendence that would be missing—or at least appear to be missing—from
an investigation conducted by their own personnel; because the investiga-
tion will lead to an analysis of the organization’s legal rights and obliga-
tions and potential liability, which outside counsel are well-suited to
address; or because they lack the expertise or resources to conduct an
investigation of the nature or scope contemplated.  For law firms, internal
investigations are a lucrative practice area and the publicity that such in-
vestigations sometimes attract has marketing value.3  Indeed, internal in-
vestigations are now “big business” for law firms.4  Large law firms
constantly look to hire former federal and state prosecutors to augment
their internal investigations practices on the theory that investigative skills
developed in government service will translate readily to private practice.
As profitable or otherwise valuable or interesting as internal investiga-
tions may be from lawyers’ or law firms’ standpoints, however, they also
give rise to professional liability and responsibility challenges and risks.5
Both clients and third parties may become potential adversaries if things
allegedly go wrong.
Assume, for example, that the audit committee of a corporation’s
board of directors retained you to investigate a former employee’s allega-
tion that the CEO has engaged in fraud and self-dealing by contracting on
behalf of the corporation with companies he secretly owns in whole or
part.  According to the former employee, the contracts are for needless or
over-priced services; they are in fact vehicles for the CEO to divert corpo-
rate funds.  You interview the former employee, seemingly key current em-
ployees, and the CEO.  You also review documents.  Based on your
investigation, you recommend to the audit committee that the board fire
3. Miriam Rozen, Avoiding the Quicksand, AM. LAW., June 2017, at 14.
4. Marcus A. Asner & Alexander L. Miller, A Measured Approach to Internal In-
vestigations, LAW360 (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/721396/a-
measured-approach-to-internal-investigations [https://perma.cc/GVU5-6E75]; see
also Miriam Rozen, Big Law Doubles Down on White-Collar, Investigations Practices, AM.
LAW. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/sites/americanlawyer
/2018/01/19/big-law-doubles-down-on-white-collar-investigations-practices
[https://perma.cc/Z49B-QCNB] (reporting that large U.S. law firms are signifi-
cantly expanding their internal investigations practices because of the growth in
demand by corporate clients fueled by increases in qui tam litigation, attorney
general suits, and government regulation in general).
5. See William C. Wagner & Trent J. Sandifur, Legal Malpractice Claims Resulting
from Internal Investigations, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 2013, at 39 (highlighting several pro-
fessional liability risks arising out of lawyers’ failures to confront common internal
investigation pitfalls).
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the CEO, which it does.  The CEO promptly sues you and your law firm for
defamation, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tor-
tious interference with business relationships.  He alleges that your investi-
gation was at best incomplete.  Had you investigated more thoroughly, he
says, you would have learned that he forced the former employee to resign
for poor performance, and that she was an unstable witness who was seek-
ing retribution; you would have discovered that the employees you inter-
viewed were not sufficiently involved in the contracting process to be
reliable informants; you would have interviewed other employees who
could have explained the commercial reasonableness of the contracts;
and, worst of all, had you inquired further, you would have learned that he
had no interest in the subject companies.  The CEO asserts that when you
interviewed him you did not ask relevant questions, and you did not share
enough information about the investigation or the accusations against
him to have enabled him to correct your misimpressions.  His claimed
damages in the form of future lost income are significant.
On what is essentially the other side of the same coin, assume that a
company’s audit committee hired you to investigate an allegation anony-
mously made over the company’s ethics hotline that three executives were
conspiring to defraud the company by channeling payments to shell cor-
porations they secretly controlled.  You conducted an investigation and
thereafter reported to the committee that the allegations were meritless.
The company took no action as a result.  A subsequent criminal investiga-
tion triggered by allegations made by the estranged spouse of one of the
executives in their divorce proceedings determined that the allegations
were actually true.  As it turns out, the executives stole over $30 million
from the company through their scheme, and $20 million of that loss
came after you completed your investigation and cleared them of any
wrongdoing.  Now the company has sued you for negligence, alleging that
your inadequate investigation allowed the executives’ fraud to continue,
and that it incurred damages of at least $20 million as a consequence.
Alternatively, imagine that a public corporation’s audit committee re-
tains you to investigate press reports that the corporation had unlawfully
backdated stock options granted to executives.6  With the investigation
barely underway, the corporation and its senior officers, including the
chief financial officer (CFO), are sued in a securities class action concern-
ing the alleged backdating practices.  The corporation hires you to re-
present all the defendants in that case.  You interview the CFO regarding
the corporation’s stock option granting practices.  Afterwards, you keep
the CFO and other senior executives apprised of the status of your investi-
gation.  Ultimately, with the corporation’s permission, you reveal the sub-
stance of your conversation with the CFO to FBI agents conducting a
parallel government investigation into the backdating.  When the CFO
6. These are the slightly modified facts of United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600
(9th Cir. 2009), discussed in detail in Part III.B.
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learns that the government intends to use this information to charge him
criminally, he asserts that he shared an attorney-client relationship with
you as a result of the securities class action in which he is a defendant
alongside the corporation.  He says that his interview with you occurred in
that context.  Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege prevented you
from sharing the content of that conversation with the FBI without his
consent, and the government cannot use his privileged statements to build
a criminal case against him.  What result?  Either way, are there any nega-
tive consequences for you or your law firm?
As hypothetical as these scenarios may seem, they accurately depict
some of the very real risks that internal investigations pose for lawyers who
practice in this dynamic area.  Indeed, risks along these lines have come
home to roost for top-flight law firms.
For example, after creditors forced beverage company Le-Nature’s,
Inc. into bankruptcy, the trustee of Le-Nature’s liquidating trust sued Le-
Nature’s prominent former law firm for allegedly botching an internal in-
vestigation into massive fraud by Le-Nature’s CEO, Greg Podlucky, that
contributed to the bankruptcy.7  The trustee alleged that the law firm’s
deficient investigation failed to detect the fraud; Podlucky’s fraud contin-
ued apace even during the investigation as a result of the firm’s negli-
gence; because of the firm’s flawed investigation and misleading report of
its results, the independent directors who initiated the investigation were
misled into believing that the allegations of Podlucky’s misconduct were
baseless; and the law firm concealed Podlucky’s fraud, thereby leading the
independent directors to relax their vigilance.8  Had the law firm uncov-
ered Podlucky’s fraud as it should have, the trustee claimed, the directors
could have halted it, avoided certain financings, and closed the company,
thereby preserving significant asset value.9  The firm settled the trustee’s
lawsuit for $23.75 million.10  The settlement paled in comparison to the
$500 million in damages the trustee had sought from the firm.11  The firm
denied all allegations of negligence.12
7. Kirschner v. K & L Gates LLP, 46 A.3d 737 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
8. Id. at 753.
9. Id. at 754 (quoting the trustee’s complaint).
10. Dan Packel, K&L Gates’ $24M Malpractice Deal OK’d In Le-Nature’s Case,
LAW360 (Feb. 27, 2014),  https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/51381
6/k-l-gates-24m-malpractice-deal-ok-d-in-le-nature-s-case [https://perma.cc/RQZ5-
BGW3]; Richard Gazarik, LeNature Legal Malpractice Lawsuit Settled for More than
$23.7 Million, TRIB LIVE (Jan. 28, 2014), http://triblive.com/news/adminpage/54
93392-74/ferguson-lenature-podlucky [https://perma.cc/6P28-2QCK].
11. Packel, supra note 10.
12. See id. (listing as one reason for preliminary approval of the settlement
“K&L Gates’ continued denial of negligent conduct”); Martha Neil, K&L Gates Oks
Settlement of $23.7M in LeNature’s Legal Malpractice Case, ABA J. (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/kl_gates_oks_settlement_of_23.7m_in_
lenature_legal_malpractice_case/ [https://perma.cc/7NQN-Q38X] (reporting
that the settlement by the law firm and one of its partners “did not involve any
admission of liability”).
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Another excellent law firm was accused of inadequately investigating
alleged accounting improprieties at the now defunct telecommunications
company Global Crossing Ltd.13  The law firm denied any negligence, as-
serting that its partner who was responsible for the internal investigation
“was never charged with conducting a full-scale investigation, but rather a
narrow inquiry” that it characterized as “a ‘look-see’ and a ‘rogue elephant
hunt.’”14  Investors and former Global Crossing employees who lost their
investments and pensions when the company failed filed a class action
against various defendants whose alleged misconduct supposedly caused
or contributed to the failure.15  The plaintiffs eventually settled with sev-
eral defendants for a combined $325 million.16  The law firm contributed
$19.5 million to the settlement even though it was not named as a defen-
dant in the action.17
Pepper Hamilton LLP was sued by two former Baylor University em-
ployees in connection with the firm’s investigation into alleged sexual as-
saults of female students by Baylor football players.18  Former assistant
athletic director Colin Shillinglaw asserted that he was defamed by reports
that he failed to respond to the alleged assaults.19  Baylor fired him after
Pepper Hamilton lawyers investigated the allegations against him and re-
ported their findings to Baylor’s Board of Regents.20  Similarly, long-time
13. Gretchen Morgenson, Global Crossing Settles Suit on Losses, BUS. DAY, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/20/business/global-
crossing-settles-suit-on-losses.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fgretchen-morgen
son [https://perma.cc/BT2X-2FB6]; Steven Pearlstein, Corporate Counsel Gone
Astray, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
business/2003/03/19/corporate-counsel-gone-astray/915010f5-bdf7-4cc1-b92c-c1
53fd8ab477/?utm_term=.80b5f6283dc6 [https://perma.cc/4D59-EP8C]; Dennis
K. Berman, Global Crossing Board Report Rebukes Ex-Outside Counsel, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
11, 2003), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB104732497644513500 [https://per
ma.cc/RDR6-K6WB].
14. Berman, supra note 13.
15. Morgenson, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Lizzy McLellan & John Council, When an Investigation Becomes a Scrimmage,
AM. LAW., Mar. 2017, at 13; John Council, Ex-Football Official Sues Baylor, Pepper Ham-
ilton for Libel Over Sexual Assault Scandal, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202778322232/ExFootball-
Official-Sues-Baylor-Pepper-Hamilton-for-Libel-Over-Sexual-Assault-Scandal/?cmp
=share_twitter [https://perma.cc/DF6M-8YVJ]; Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach,
Ex-Baylor Official Colin Shillinglaw Alleges Slander, Libel, Wrongful Firing, ESPN.COM
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/18595095/
colin-shillinglaw-ex-baylor-bears-assistant-athletics-director-files-civil-lawsuit-universi
ty-others [https://perma.cc/VQ2W-Y5D4]; Lizzy McLellan, Pepper Hamilton Faces
Lawsuit Over Baylor Report, TEX. LAW. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.law.com/texas-
lawyer/almID/1202774849725/Pepper-Hamilton-Faces-Lawsuit-Over-Baylor-Repo
rt/?mcode=1202619333591&curindex=2&curpage=ALL [https://perma.cc/9CJW-
FSXC].
19. McLellan & Council, supra note 18, at 13.
20. Id.  Shillinglaw later dismissed his lawsuit to pursue his claims in arbitra-
tion under the terms of his employment contract with Baylor.  Lizzy McLellan, Ex-
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Baylor employee, Tom Hill alleged that he was unfairly fired as a result of
Pepper Hamilton’s flawed investigation and subsequent report of the re-
sults to the Regents.21  He alleged that the firm’s lawyers “failed to fulfill
their entire charge” because they “did not interview several important wit-
nesses, and did not give a full, accurate, unbiased report.”22  Hill claimed
that the circumstances surrounding his misguided termination had left
him unemployable despite an impeccable performance history.23
Certainly, many—perhaps most—allegations of defamation, legal
malpractice, negligence, or other wrongdoing by lawyers conducting inter-
nal investigations are meritless.24  Even then, the lawyers and law firms
must endure the distraction, expense, practice disruption, stigma, and
stress of litigation.  Unfounded misconduct allegations may nonetheless
impair client relationships and foreclose new business opportunities.  In
some instances, the lawyers may also face professional disciplinary pro-
ceedings, which will have negative effects like those in civil litigation.  The
need for lawyers to exercise care in conducting internal investigations
should therefore be apparent.
This Article examines select professional liability, professional respon-
sibility, attorney-client privilege, work product immunity, and other law of
lawyering issues that potentially challenge lawyers who conduct internal
investigations.  We begin in Part II with the subject of client identity.  In
other words, who is the client for purposes of the investigation?  The an-
swer to this question is not always as clear as it might seem that it should
be, although a correct answer is critically important.  It is, after all, the
client who determines the purpose and scope of the investigation, and to
whom the lawyers report their progress, key developments, and the results
of the investigation.  It is the client to whom the lawyers owe ethical duties
of competence, communication, confidentiality, diligence, and loyalty,25
and who controls the attorney-client privilege with respect to the lawyers’
communications.  Finally for now, it is the existence of an attorney-client
Baylor Football Director Drops Claims Over Pepper’s Report, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Apr.
10, 2017), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/1202783396429/
[https://perma.cc/DBX5-SQBJ].
21. McLellan, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1263–74 (11th Cir. 2018) (re-
jecting the plaintiff’s defamation claims against the lead investigating lawyer and
his law firm); Salvatore v. Kumar, 845 N.Y.S.2d 384, 389 (App. Div. 2007) (rejecting
the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim against her former law firm and one of its
partners).
25. See Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Blyler, 787 S.E.2d 596, 612 (W. Va. 2016)
(“A lawyer owes an ethical duty to clients including the duty of candor, loyalty,
diligence, and competence.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2017) (governing lawyers’ duty to communicate with clients); id. r. 1.6 (im-
posing a duty of confidentiality).
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relationship that generally provides the foundation for professional liabil-
ity claims against lawyers who allegedly mishandle representations.26
Part III examines two related issues: (a) the concern that lawyers who
conduct internal investigations on behalf of organizations will develop im-
plied or de facto attorney-client relationships with the employees or other
constituents with whom they interact; and (b) investigating lawyers’ con-
current representation of organizations and their constituents.  In doing
so, it discusses lawyers’ use of corporate Miranda or Upjohn warnings to
prevent the formation of implied or de facto attorney-client relationships.
Following that discussion, it reviews in detail a leading case that richly illus-
trates the problems posed by concurrent representations in this context.
Recognizing that organizational constituents and other witnesses with
whom lawyers conducting internal investigations interact may or may not
be represented by counsel, Part IV discusses lawyers’ ethical duties in both
circumstances.  The discussion naturally centers on Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct 4.2 and 4.3; the former rule governs lawyers’ ex parte com-
munications with represented persons, while the latter rule addresses
lawyers’ dealings with people who are unrepresented.27
26. Clients who sue lawyers for alleged misconduct in their representations
typically focus on two theories of liability: (1) professional negligence, often de-
scribed as legal malpractice; and (2) breach of fiduciary duty.  Liability for legal
malpractice requires a plaintiff to prove the lawyer owed her a duty of care, breach
of that duty, proximate cause, and damages.  Sheretz v. Brownstein, Rask, Sweeney,
Kerr, Grim, Desylvia & Hay, LLP, 407 P.3d 914, 917 (Or. Ct. App. 2017); Rogers v.
Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 400 (Tex. 2017).  Because a lawyer’s duty of care flows
from the attorney-client relationship, lawyers are usually liable for professional
negligence only to clients.  McIntosh Cty. Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745
N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. 2008); AG Capital Funding Partners, L.P. v. State Street
Bank & Tr. Co., 842 N.E.2d 471, 478 (N.Y. 2005) (quoting Estate of Spivey v. Pul-
ley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1988)); see also Hungate v. Law Office of
David B. Rosen, 391 P.3d 1, 12 (Haw. 2017) (stating that “absent special circum-
stances, attorneys owe no duty of care to non-clients”).  This is the “strict privity”
rule.  Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames, PC, 364 P.3d 872, 876–77 (Colo. 2016); Blair v.
Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 458–59 (Haw. 2001); Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 887 N.E.2d
1167, 1171 (Ohio 2008); Friske v. Hogan, 698 N.W.2d 526, 529 (S.D. 2005); John-
son v. Hart, 692 S.E.2d 239, 243 (Va. 2010).  Although breach of fiduciary duty and
legal malpractice generally are separate causes of action, the elements are similar.
Liability for breach of fiduciary duty requires a plaintiff to prove “‘(1) the exis-
tence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proxi-
mately caused by the breach.’”  Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 72 (Ct.
App. 2006) (quoting Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 768, 776 (Ct. App.
1995)); see also Robert T. McLean Irrevocable Tr. v. Patrick Davis, P.C., 283 S.W.3d
786, 792–93 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Koger v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 28
S.W.3d 405, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)).  Similar to the strict privity rule for legal
malpractice liability, “the predicate of the attorney’s fiduciary obligations is the
existence of an attorney-client relationship.” RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE § 15:6, at 677 (2017 ed.) (footnote omitted).
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017) (titled
“Communication with Person Represented by Counsel”); id. r. 4.3 (titled “Dealing
with Unrepresented Person”).
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Part V examines the attorney-client privilege and work product immu-
nity in internal investigations.  The application and waiver of the privilege
and work product protection are critical concerns in this context.  This
Part discusses in detail two recent cases that highlight the attorney-client
and work product immunity challenges that internal investigations pose
for both clients and investigating lawyers.
Part VI discusses possible defamation claims against lawyers arising
out of internal investigations.  The seriousness of this risk should be appar-
ent.  After all, internal investigations often expose serious misconduct by
employees and other close organizational constituents.  Those accused of
misconduct may lose their jobs, suffer reputational injury, and even face
criminal prosecution or regulatory penalties.  If they believe themselves to
have been wrongly accused, they may view a lawsuit against the investigat-
ing lawyers as their best hope for restitution and vindication.
Finally, Part VII briefly asks whether an organization’s regular outside
counsel should conduct an internal investigation, or whether the organiza-
tion should retain separate counsel for the task.  There are arguments
both for and against the use of an organization’s regular outside counsel
to conduct an internal investigation.  Part VII succinctly concludes that the
answer to the question depends on the facts of the case.
II. IDENTIFYING THE CLIENT
The first step for lawyers who are retained to conduct an internal in-
vestigation is identifying the client.28  As noted earlier, client identifica-
tion has a number of practical and professional ramifications for lawyers.
A lawyer’s retention to investigate potential misconduct within an organi-
zation does not necessarily mean that the organization is the lawyer’s cli-
ent.  Depending on the circumstances, the client may be the CEO, the
board of directors, the board chair, or a committee of the board, such as
an audit committee, or a special litigation committee or other ad hoc com-
mittee.29  Alternatively, the organization may be the client, and the individ-
ual or body who or which retains the lawyer is simply the constituent
authorized to direct the lawyer’s work, communicate with the lawyer, and
invoke or waive the attorney-client privilege.30  From the lawyer’s perspec-
28. Jeffrey P. Doss, Practical Considerations in Planning, Executing, Refining, and
Concluding Investigations, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 567, 567 (2016); Barry F. McNeil
& Brad D. Brian, Overview: Initiating an Internal Investigation and Assembling the Inves-
tigative Team, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 1, 7 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad
D. Brian eds., 3d ed. 2007).
29. McNeil & Brian, supra note 28, at 7.
30. See Michael Dockterman, Protecting the Attorney-Client Privilege during an In-
ternal Investigation, in THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION 317, 319
(Vincent S. Walkowiak & Oscar R. Rodriguez eds., 6th ed. 2015) (“In an internal
investigation, the client is the corporation itself.”); R. Christopher Cook, Representa-
tion Issues in Corporate Internal Investigations: Identifying and Assessing Risks, in JONES
DAY, CORPORATE INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 16, 17 (2013), http://www.jonesday.
com [Permalink unavailable] (asserting that in an internal investigation the corpo-
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tive, the practical and professional considerations will often be the same
under either approach, provided that treating the organization as the cli-
ent does not somehow create the impression that a particular constituent
who should not be involved in the investigation is entitled to be.  The fun-
damental question, of course, is how do the parties want to structure the
attorney-client relationship, or, retrospectively, how did they do so?  In any
event, client identity is not driven by who pays the lawyer’s fees, because
the payment of fees does not alone create an attorney-client
relationship.31
Controversies over client status typically surface where a corporate
employee claims to have an attorney-client relationship with an investigat-
ing lawyer in addition to the lawyer’s relationship with the corporation, as
we will see later.  But that is not the only context in which client identifica-
tion may be an issue, as Estate of Paterno v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n32
illustrates.
Estate of Paterno arose out of the scandal that enveloped Pennsylvania
State University (Penn State) after a former assistant football coach, Jerry
Sandusky, was accused of using his university connection to sexually mo-
lest boys.33  He was later convicted of related crimes and sentenced to
prison.34  Penn State created a Special Investigations Task Force (the Task
Force) comprised of alumni, faculty, students, and trustees to investigate
the university’s response to early reports of Sandusky’s crimes.35  The in-
vestigation was conducted by Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP (FSS), a law
firm founded by former FBI Director Louis Freeh.36  FSS was retained in
November 2011.37
In July 2012, FSS delivered a report (the Freeh Report) that detailed
its investigation of Penn State’s handling of Sandusky’s grotesque miscon-
duct.38  The Freeh Report concluded that the late Joe Paterno, Penn
State’s revered former head football coach, was told of Sandusky’s crimes
before Sandusky retired from Penn State, but failed to act on those re-
ports.39  The Freeh Report also concluded that Penn State officials con-
ration is the investigating lawyer’s client regardless of whether the lawyer is “hired
by the corporation itself or by the corporation’s general counsel,” but not explain-
ing what it means to be “hired by the corporation itself”).
31. Palmer v. Super. Ct., 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 620, 628 (Ct. App. 2014); Rubin &
Norris, L.L.C. v. Panzarella, 51 N.E.3d 879, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); State ex rel.
Stovall v. Meneley, 22 P.3d 124, 140 (Kan. 2001); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md.
v. Brooke, 821 A.2d 414, 424 (Md. 2003); State ex rel. Thompson v. Dueker, 346
S.W.3d 390, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011); In re Disciplinary Action Against Giese, 662
N.W.2d 250, 255 (N.D. 2003).
32. 168 A.3d 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 195 (providing the date of FSS’s engagement letter).
38. Id. at 191–92.
39. Id.
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spired to keep Sandusky’s behavior secret.40  The NCAA adopted the
Freeh Report in imposing significant sanctions on Penn State through a
consent decree.41
Paterno’s estate, two of Paterno’s sons, and a Penn State trustee sued
the NCAA, Penn State, and others for breach of contract, commercial dis-
paragement, defamation, and interference with contractual relations.42
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants should have known that the
Freeh Report represented “an unreliable rush to judgment” that produced
baseless conclusions.43  Soon after filing suit, the plaintiffs notified FSS of
their intent to subpoena its files underlying the Freeh Report.44  FSS and
Penn State objected on attorney-client privilege and work product immu-
nity grounds.45  The trial court overruled the objections and later en-
forced the plaintiffs’ subpoena.46  The defendants took interlocutory
appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.47
With respect to the defendants’ attorney-client privilege objections,
the trial court had concluded that the Task Force—not Penn State—was
FSS’s client.48  Consequently, Penn State lacked standing to assert the at-
torney-client privilege with respect to communications between FSS and
the Task Force.49
On appeal, the defendants argued that Penn State was FSS’s client
because Penn State created the Task Force; the Task Force had no inde-
pendent legal identity and no budget of its own; the chair of Penn State’s
board of trustees, who was not a member of the Task Force, signed the
November 2011 engagement letter with FSS on Penn State’s behalf; and
Penn State paid FSS’s fees.50  As further evidence of an attorney-client re-
lationship between Penn State and FSS, the defendants pointed to (1) a
December 2011 letter from Penn State’s general counsel to FSS stating
that Penn State’s president, trustees, and Task Force members believed
that FSS represented Penn State; and (2) a July 2012 letter from Penn
State’s outside counsel to Freeh stating that FSS represented Penn State
and articulating Penn State’s position on the attorney-client privilege re-
garding certain materials.51  The plaintiffs countered that (a) Freeh had
testified in a deposition that the Task Force was FSS’s sole client; and (b)
in her December 2011 letter to FSS, Penn State’s general counsel had de-
40. Id. at 192.
41. Id.
42. See id. (listing the plaintiffs’ causes of action).
43. Id. (quoting the plaintiffs’ complaint).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 193.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 194–95.
51. Id. at 195.
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scribed the Task Force as “independent and distinct from Penn State and
its board of trustees.”52
Both sides focused on the terms of FSS’s engagement letter.53  The
Estate of Paterno court did likewise, starting with the opening paragraph,
which stated:
We are pleased that the Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania
State University [. . .] on behalf of the [Task Force] established
by the Trustees [. . .] has engaged us to represent the [Task
Force]. [. . .] Accordingly, this is to set forth the basic terms upon
which FSS has been engaged to represent the [Task Force], in-
cluding the anticipated scope of our services and billing policies
and practices that will apply to the engagement.54
The engagement letter also stated:
FSS has been engaged to serve as independent, external legal
counsel to the [Task Force] to perform an independent, full and
complete investigation of the recently publicized allegations of
sexual abuse at the facilities and the alleged failure of [Penn
State] personnel to report such sexual abuse to appropriate po-
lice and governmental authorities.  The results of FSS’s investiga-
tion will be provided in a written report to the [Task Force] and
other parties as so directed by the [Task Force].55
The letter included other provisions or statements indicating that the
Task Force was FSS’s client, including a confidentiality provision which
referred to FSS’s work and advice to the Task Force, and a paragraph that
stated: “FSS will provide the above-described legal services for the [Task
Force’s] benefit, for which the Trustees will be billed in the manner set
forth above.”56  With respect to possible termination of FSS’s representa-
tion, the engagement letter stated that either FSS or the Task Force could
do so upon written notice.57  In discussing client files, the engagement
letter specifically referred to the Task Force’s representation.58  Finally,
the engagement letter stated that FSS was “delighted to be asked to pro-
vide legal services to the [Task Force],” and that FSS was “looking forward
to working with the [Task Force] on this engagement.”59
In short, the Estate of Paterno court reasoned, the engagement letter
consistently (a) distinguished between Penn State’s board of trustees and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting the engagement letter) (alterations in the original text).
55. Id. (quoting the engagement letter) (emphasis omitted; alterations in the
original text).
56. Id. at 196 (alteration in the original text).
57. Id. (quoting the engagement letter).
58. Id. (quoting the engagement letter).
59. Id. (quoting the engagement letter) (alterations in the original text).
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the Task Force, and (b) identified the Task Force as the recipient of FSS’s
services.60  The defendants could cite no legal authority that prevented
Penn State from retaining and paying FSS to represent the Task Force,
precluded the parties from limiting the attorney-client relationship to FSS
and the Task Force, or compelled the conclusion that the Task Force had
to be a “distinct legal entity” to be a client of FSS.61  As for the signature of
the chair of Penn State’s board of trustees on the engagement letter, that
was required because Penn State was to pay FSS’s fees; it was not “‘fatally
inconsistent’ with a conclusion that the Task Force was [FSS’s] client,” as
the defendants argued.62  In contrast, the additional signature of the Task
Force chair, Kenneth Frazier, on the engagement letter undermined the
defendants’ argument that Penn State was FSS’s client.63  If Penn State was
FSS’s client and the Task Force had no separate identity, the court ex-
plained, Frazier’s signature would have been superfluous.64
The Estate of Paterno court concluded that the trial court did not err
when it found that FSS had limited its representation to the Task Force.65
It therefore upheld the trial court’s determination that Penn State lacked
standing to assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to the disputed
materials because it was not FSS’s client.66
Estate of Paterno highlights several important issues or points for law-
yers who conduct internal investigations.  First, it is essential for the lawyer
to identify the client in an engagement letter in this context just as it is in
any other practice area.67
Second, it is possible to designate a board of directors, a committee,
or some other specially-formed group as the client even though that body
is not a distinct legal entity.68  In such a case, the lawyer must not reveal
confidential communications with board, committee, or group members
to others in the organization lest those disclosures potentially waive the
attorney-client privilege.69  The board, committee, or group members re-
sponsible for the investigation must be similarly cautious.70
Third, a third party may fund an internal investigation.  Again, the
payment of a lawyer’s fees does not by itself create an attorney-client rela-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 196–97.
62. Id. at 197.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Doss, supra note 28, at 568 (recommending identifying the client in an
engagement letter).
68. See Estate of Paterno, 168 A.3d at 196–97 (discussing the Task Force as FSS’s
client).
69. See EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 519 (6th ed. 2017) (discussing waiver by voluntary disclosure
“to a party outside the zone of privilege”).
70. Id.
12
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tionship.71  The lawyer may not, however, allow the third party to direct or
regulate her professional judgment in conducting the investigation.72
The third party’s payment of the lawyer’s fees does not alter the lawyer’s
obligations to her client.73
III. CORPORATE MIRANDA OR UPJOHN WARNINGS AND CONCURRENT
REPRESENTATION
The client identity debate in Estate of Paterno was resolved by examin-
ing the law firm’s engagement letter.  But the existence of an attorney-
client relationship is not always so neatly identified or framed.  This is be-
cause an attorney-client relationship need not be expressly contractual;74
it may be inferred from the parties’ conduct.75  When considering
whether a de facto or implied attorney-client relationship exists, courts do
not consider the lawyer’s reasonable expectations.76  Instead, courts focus
on the would-be client’s expectations and particularly the reasonableness
of his belief “that he is consulting a lawyer in that capacity and his mani-
fested intention to seek professional legal advice.”77  Or, as a Wisconsin
federal court explained, a party establishes a de facto or implied attorney-
client relationship “if it shows (1) that it submitted confidential informa-
tion to a lawyer, and (2) that it did so with a reasonable belief that the
lawyer was acting as the party’s attorney.”78  Either way, a putative client’s
unilateral belief that an attorney-client relationship exists is insufficient to
establish such a relationship.79  Rather, any subjective expectation must be
accompanied by objective facts on which a reasonable person would rely as
71. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
73. Id. r. 5.4 cmt. 1.
74. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Super. Ct., 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 526, 537 (Ct. App.
2013); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. White, 136 A.3d 819, 830–31 (Md. 2016).
75. Fla. Bar v. King, 664 So. 2d 925, 927 (Fla. 1995); NuStar Farms, L.L.C. v.
Zylstra, 880 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Iowa 2016); In re Hodge, 407 P.3d 613, 648 (Kan.
2017); Savell v. Duddy, 147 A.3d 1179, 1185 (Me. 2017) (quoting Bd. of Overseers
of the Bar v. Dineen, 500 A.2d 262, 264–65 (Me. 1985)); C.K. Indus. Corp. v. C.M.
Indus. Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 410, 411 (App. Div. 1995); In re Disciplinary Action
Against Ward, 881 N.W.2d 226, 229–30 (N.D. 2016); Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Ass’n v.
Hardiman, 798 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ohio 2003); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Helton, 394 P.3d 227, 236 n.14 (Okla. 2017); In re Conduct of Wyllie, 19 P.3d 338,
344 (Or. 2001); In re Baytown Nissan Inc., 451 S.W.3d 140, 146 (Tex. App. 2015);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 cmt. c (2000).
76. Rubin & Norris, L.L.C. v. Panzarella, 51 N.E.3d 879, 891 (Ill. App. Ct.
2016); Carnegie Cos. v. Summit Props., 918 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009).
77. Diversified Grp., Inc. v. Daugerdas, 139 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
78. Nelson v. Green Builders, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1439, 1445 (E.D. Wis. 1993).
79. Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Guillebeau v.
Jenkins, 355 S.E.2d 453, 458 (Ga. 1987); Border Demolition & Envtl., Inc. v.
Pineda, 535 S.W.3d 140, 152 (Tex. App. 2017).
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supporting the existence of an attorney-client relationship.80  For exam-
ple, a person’s subjective belief may be held to be reasonable where the
surrounding facts and circumstances placed the lawyer on notice that the
person intended to form an attorney-client relationship, indicated that the
lawyer shared the person’s subjective intention to create the relationship,
or demonstrated that the lawyer acted in a manner that would prompt a
reasonable person in the putative client’s position to rely on the lawyer’s
professional advice.81  In contrast, a would-be client’s subjective belief is
unreasonable where the lawyer has specifically informed the would-be cli-
ent that she does not or will not represent him.82
With respect to internal investigations, there is a concern that employ-
ees who are interviewed by, or otherwise communicate with, the organiza-
tion’s lawyer during the investigation may believe that the lawyer also
represents them.  If, in fact, the organization’s lawyer does share an attor-
ney-client relationship with an employee, a host of problems may follow.
For instance, the lawyer may have a conflict of interest that requires her to
withdraw from the matter altogether.83  The employee may be able to in-
voke the attorney-client privilege in related proceedings and thus frustrate
the organization’s ability to resolve those disputes on favorable terms, such
as where the organization wishes to waive the privilege to avoid possible
criminal charges or deflect regulatory action.84  Similarly, the employee
may instruct the lawyer to keep their communications confidential,
thereby preventing the lawyer from sharing information learned from the
employee with the organization (there is no co-client exception to lawyers’
ethical duty of confidentiality) and impairing the organization’s ability to
fulfill the purposes of the investigation.85
80. See Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1281–83 (11th Cir.
2004) (applying Florida law); DC Cogen Partners, L.L.C. v. Lane Powell PC, 917 F.
Supp. 2d 1123, 1137 (D. Or. 2013) (quoting In re Conduct of Weidner, 801 P.2d
828, 837 (Or. 1990)).
81. DC Cogen Partners, L.L.C., 917 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (quoting In re Conduct of
Weidner, 801 P.2d at 837).
82. See, e.g., Rusk v. Harstad, 393 P.3d 341, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (con-
cluding that a would-be client could not have reasonably believed that the law firm
represented him where the lawyer had clearly stated in multiple e-mails that the
law firm would not represent him).
83. See Paul B. Murphy & Lucian E. Dervan, Watching Your Step: Avoiding the
Pitfalls and Perils of Corporate Internal Investigations, LOSS PREVENTION J. (Attorneys’
Liab. Assur. Soc’y, Inc., Chicago, IL), Summer 2005, at 2, 4 (citing E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969)).
84. Id.
85. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-450, at 1
(2008) (stating that “[w]hen a lawyer represents multiple clients, either in the
same or related matters, Model Rule 1.6 requires that the lawyer protect the confi-
dentiality of information relating to each of his clients”); Fla. Eth. Op. 95-4, 1997
WL 307142, at *5–7 (Fla. State Bar Ass’n, Comm. on Prof’l Ethics 1997) (explain-
ing that there is no co-client exception to lawyers’ duty of confidentiality in joint
representations); N.Y. Eth. Op. 555, 1984 WL 50010, at *4 (N.Y. State Bar Ass’n,
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics 1984) (concluding that the lawyer could not share with
one joint client information shared with the lawyer by the other joint client in
14
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A. Corporate Miranda or Upjohn Warnings
To avoid these problems, careful lawyers deliver “corporate Miranda
warnings” or “Upjohn warnings” at the outset of employee interviews con-
ducted as part of an internal investigation.86  In these warnings, prudent
lawyers clearly state that (1) they represent the organization and not the
employee; (2) the interview is intended to enable the lawyer to provide
legal advice to the organization, and that the interview is therefore cov-
ered by the organization’s attorney-client privilege; (3) it is important for
the employee to keep the subject and content of the interview confidential
to protect the organization’s attorney-client privilege; and (4) the decision
to assert or to waive the privilege is the organization’s alone to make, and
that it may do so without consulting the employee.87  If the investigation
possibly has criminal implications, the lawyer should inform the employee
as part of the fourth point that the organization may disclose information
learned in the investigation to law enforcement agencies.88  A corporate
Miranda or Upjohn warning goes beyond the disclosures an investigating
lawyer must make under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13(f),
which states that a lawyer representing an organization “shall explain the
identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the organization’s interests are adverse to those of the constituents
with whom the lawyer is dealing.”89
confidence absent the confiding client’s consent); see also Wagner & Sandifur,
supra note 5, at 42 (“One of the problems that a corporation can have if an attor-
ney inadvertently establishes an attorney-client relationship with an interviewed
employee is that the employee must specifically authorize the release of statements
that the employee made to counsel during an investigation interview.”).
86. See generally Daniel C. Headrick & Ryan L. Harrison, Understanding Corpo-
rate Miranda Warnings, FOR THE DEF., Apr. 2013, at 39 (“T]he so-called corporate
Miranda warning was impliedly created in 1981 when the . . . Supreme Court ex-
panded the attorney-client privilege to cover certain communications between at-
torneys representing a corporation and the corporation’s employees in Upjohn
Company v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).”); William J. Powell & Emily M.
Renzelli, Not Just for Criminal Lawyers, FOR THE DEF., Oct. 2010, at 65, 66 (“The
warnings commonly given [to employees] during a corporate internal investiga-
tion are colloquially referred to as ‘corporate Miranda,’ and stem from the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).”).
87. See ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP, DESKBOOK ON INTERNAL INVESTI-
GATIONS, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE, AND WHITE COLLAR ISSUES § 1:3.3[B], at 1-11 to -
12 (2d ed. 2016 & Supp. 2017) [hereinafter DESKBOOK ON INTERNAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS] (outlining issues to be covered in an Upjohn warning); Randall J. Turk &
Mark Miller, The Witness Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
93, 103–04 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian eds., 3d ed. 2007) (listing the subjects
to be addressed in warnings to witnesses who are interviewed in an internal
investigation).
88. See DESKBOOK ON INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 87, § 1:3.3[B], at 1-
12 (instructing that when warning a witness that the organization may waive the
attorney-client privilege, a lawyer should identify law enforcement authorities as
being among the third parties to whom disclosure may be made).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal90 highlights the importance of
these warnings. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal involved a March
2001 internal investigation by AOL Time Warner (AOL) into its relation-
ship with PurchasePro, Inc.91  AOL hired Wilmer Cutler & Pickering
(Wilmer) to assist with the investigation.92  AOL in-house lawyers and
Wilmer lawyers repeatedly interviewed AOL employees Kent Wakeford,
John Doe 1, and John Doe 2.93  They told the employees that they repre-
sented AOL; although their conversations were privileged, the privilege
belonged to AOL and was AOL’s to assert or waive; and if there was a
conflict between the employee and AOL, the attorney–client privilege be-
longed to AOL.94  They told Wakeford that they “could” represent him as
well as AOL, so long as no conflicts of interest surfaced.95  Similarly, they
told John Doe 1 that “[we] can represent [you] until such time as there
appears to be a conflict of interest,” and told John Doe 2 that “[w]e re-
present AOL, and can represent [you] too if there is not a conflict.”96
In contrast to their statements to the employees about the possibility
of representing them as well as AOL, they informed Wakeford that he was
free to retain personal counsel at AOL’s expense.97  When John Doe 1
asked if he needed personal counsel, a Wilmer lawyer answered that he
did not recommend it, but said that he would tell AOL not to be con-
cerned if John Doe 1 hired a lawyer.98
In November 2001, the SEC launched an investigation into AOL’s
dealings with PurchasePro, and as part of that investigation interviewed
Wakeford and John Doe 1.99  The employees invoked the attorney-client
privilege with respect to their interviews in the internal investigation.100
When a federal grand jury subpoenaed the lawyers’ interview notes, AOL
agreed to waive the attorney-client privilege and produce the notes, but
the employees resisted.101  They moved to quash the subpoenas, asserting
that they had individual attorney-client relationships with the investigating
90. 415 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2005).
91. Id. at 335.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 336.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 337.
101. Id.
16
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lawyers that they did not wish to waive.102  The district court denied the
motions to quash and the employees appealed.103
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court,104 stating that the “es-
sential touchstones” of an attorney-client relationship between the lawyers
and the employees “were missing at the time of the interviews.”105  There
was no sign “of an objectively reasonable, mutual understanding that the
[employees] were seeking legal advice from the investigating attorneys or
that the investigating attorneys were rendering personal legal advice.”106
The In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal court concluded that the employ-
ees could not have reasonably believed that the lawyers represented them,
and thus they could not invoke the attorney–client privilege.107  As the
court explained:
First, there [was] no evidence that the investigating attor-
neys told the [employees] that they represented them, nor is
there evidence that the [employees] asked the investigating attor-
neys to represent them. To the contrary, there is evidence that
the investigating attorneys relayed to Wakeford the company’s of-
fer to retain personal counsel for him at the company’s expense,
and that they told John Doe 1 that he was free to retain personal
counsel.  Second, there [was] no evidence that the [employees]
ever sought personal legal advice from the investigating attor-
neys, nor is there any evidence that the investigating attorneys
rendered personal legal advice.  Third, when the [employees]
spoke with the investigating attorneys, they were fully apprised
that the information they were giving could be disclosed at the
company’s discretion.  Under these circumstances, [the employ-
ees] could not have reasonably believed that the investigating at-
torneys represented them personally.108
The In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal court reasoned that the law-
yers’ statements that they could represent the employees absent a conflict
of interest did not reflect an agreement to do so.109  After all, “ ‘we can
represent you’ is distinct from ‘we do represent you.’”110  Furthermore,
the lawyers’ statements had to be interpreted in the context of the entire
102. Id.  Wakeford, who had retained personal counsel, had entered into a
common interest agreement with AOL, and also invoked the attorney-client privi-
lege under the common interest agreement between his lawyer and AOL’s lawyers.
He lost that argument because the common interest agreement post-dated his in-
terviews in the internal investigation. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 341.
105. Id. at 338.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 339–40.
108. Id. (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 338, 340.
110. Id. at 340.
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warning they delivered, which demonstrated that their loyalty was solely to
AOL.111  By telling the employees at the outset of their interviews that they
represented AOL, and warning them that the content of their interviews
belonged to AOL, the lawyers notified the employees that, while their
communications were confidential, AOL could at any time reveal the con-
tent of the communications without their consent.112  The court nonethe-
less sounded a cautionary note:
[O]ur opinion should not be read as an implicit acceptance of
the watered-down “Upjohn warnings” the investigating attorneys
gave the [employees]. It is a potential legal and ethical minefield.
Had the investigating attorneys, in fact, entered into an attorney-
client relationship with [the employees], as their statements to
the [employees] professed they could, they would not have been
free to waive the [employees’] privilege when a conflict arose.  It
should have seemed obvious that they could not have jettisoned
one client in favor of another.  Rather, they would have had to
withdraw from all representation and to maintain all
confidences.113
Lawyers should be sure to deliver corporate Miranda or Upjohn warn-
ings before beginning any interview and should strive to make those warn-
ings as clear as possible.  Absent a clear warning, an employee or other
organizational constituent may (among other consequences) be posi-
tioned to assert a personal attorney–client privilege with an investigating
lawyer in related proceedings.114  Even imperfect warnings may be effec-
tive in light of other facts, however, as United States v. Merida115
demonstrates.
Jason Merida was the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma’s executive direc-
tor of construction.116  In 2009 and 2010, he was involved in three
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (latter emphasis added).
114. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 659 (10th Cir. 1998)
(“[W]e conclude that a limited attorney-client privilege exists between [a hospital
CEO] and [two lawyers].  Our holding is an extremely limited one and does not
extend to communications made while third parties were present nor does it ex-
tend to communications in which both corporate and individual liability were dis-
cussed.  It includes only . . . communications in which [the CEO] sought legal
advice as to his personal liability without regard to any corporate considerations.”);
United States v. Hart, Crim. A. No. 92-219, 1992 WL 348425, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov.
16, 1992) (“[I]n the absence of any advice by [the investigating lawyers] to the
contrary, [the] defendants were justified in believing that [the lawyers] were there
to protect their individual interests as well as those of the corporation. . . .  [The]
defendants reasonably believed that, during their conversations with [the lawyers],
they were clients of [the lawyers], that they were communicating with them in
their capacities as lawyers, and that they were providing legal services to them in
their individual capacities, jointly with the corporation.”).
115. 828 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2016).
116. Id. at 1204.
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schemes to defraud the Nation.117  One of them was known as the “Steel
Fraud.”118  In December 2009, the Nation’s Business Committee approved
Merida’s proposal to purchase at a twenty percent discount $10.5 million
in steel supposedly left over from a failed Las Vegas casino project for use
in future Nation construction projects.119  A Tulsa company, Builders
Steel (which participated in the fraud), was the purported seller of the
steel.120
In October 2010, after the Nation had paid approximately $9.25 mil-
lion to Builders Steel, tribal auditors visited the company’s lot and discov-
ered that at least half of the expected steel was missing.121  The Nation
then retained lawyer Michael Burrage to investigate the Steel Fraud and to
sue Builders Steel.122
In November 2010, as part of Burrage’s investigation, tribal executives
ordered Merida to appear in his capacity as a Nation employee at Bur-
rage’s office.123  Burrage and another lawyer for the Nation told Merida
upon his arrival that a court reporter would be transcribing his sworn
statement.124  The interview began this way:
Q. Jason, we’ve met.  I’m Mike Burrage.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And Bob is—Rabon is here with me. And there has been a
lawsuit filed by the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma against Build-
ers Steel in the District Court of Bryan County, Oklahoma.  And
we want to take your statement today—
A. Uh-huh.
Q. —in connection with that lawsuit.  Okay.
A. Okay.
Q. Now, what we do here, today—for the purposes of the record,
it’s covered by the attorney/client privilege because you do work
for the Choctaw Nation.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And the Nation asserts any privilege—attorney/client privi-
lege in connection with this statement.
And the other thing that we need in the record that—this—the
taking of this statement is work product of the lawyers. In other
words, what you say may not be the work product, but my ques-
tions to you are work product setting forth my mental processes
and so forth.
117. Id. at 1205.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1206.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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A. Uh-huh.
Q. So it’s the position of the Nation that this whole statement is
privilege[d] and confidential.
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that okay with you?
A. Sure.125
The Nation’s Chief and Assistant Chief subsequently asked Burrage to
report the preliminary findings from his investigation to the local U.S. At-
torney.126  A following federal criminal investigation revealed the Steel
Fraud and the other two frauds in which Merida was involved.127  The
government indicted Merida and his henchmen; everyone except Merida
pleaded guilty before trial.128
At trial, Merida testified on his own behalf, and the prosecutor
quoted portions of his sworn statement when cross-examining him.129
Merida’s lawyer interrupted and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the
transcript was protected by the attorney-client privilege because Burrage
was representing Merida when he took his statement.130  The district court
denied Merida’s motion, concluding that if Merida’s statements were privi-
leged, the privilege belonged to the Nation.131 The jury convicted Merida,
and the district court sentenced him to twelve years in prison, plus restitu-
tion.132  Merida appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a
mistrial to the Tenth Circuit.133
On appeal, Merida argued that he reasonably believed when he gave
his sworn statement that Burrage was his lawyer and that his remarks
would be protected by the attorney-client privilege.134  This argument
failed for four reasons.  First, Merida spoke with Burrage on the Nation’s
orders; he did not meet with Burrage “on his own initiative to seek legal
advice.”135  Second, when he met with Burrage, he did not tell him that he
was “seeking legal advice in [his] individual rather than in [his] represen-
tative capacit[y].”136  Third, Merida could not show that Burrage agreed
to speak with him in his individual capacity despite the possibility of a
125. Id. (quoting transcript of the interview).
126. Id. at 1207.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1207–08.
130. Id. at 1208.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1208–09.
133. Id. at 1209.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1210 (citing Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471 (10th Cir.
1989)).
136. Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653, 659 (10th Cir.
1998)).
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conflict of interest with the Nation.137  Fourth, Merida’s sworn statement
concerned the Nation’s affairs and matters.138  Under these circum-
stances, the Nation held the attorney–client privilege—not Merida.139  Af-
ter further concluding that any alleged error in the use of Merida’s sworn
statement on cross-examination was harmless, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial.140
A concurring judge observed that if Burrage’s comments to begin Me-
rida’s statement were considered “in isolation,” it would be understanda-
ble if “a layperson might have missed the nuance” that the privilege
belonged to the Nation rather than to Merida.141  Burrage should have
more precisely admonished Merida at the start of his interview.142  None-
theless, given the circumstances of the interview, Merida’s belief that his
communications with Burrage were privileged was unreasonable.143
B. Concurrent Representation Challenges
Again, corporate Miranda or Upjohn warnings are intended to prevent
the inadvertent formation of attorney-client relationships between investi-
gating lawyers and organizational constituents.144  The chance that em-
ployees or other constituents will believe the lawyer represents them in
connection with the investigation is increased where the lawyer has previ-
ously represented them in litigation in which they were co-defendants with
the organization,145 or currently represents them in other matters involv-
ing the organization.  The best example of these scenarios is the internal
investigation and subsequent litigation involving William Ruehle, the for-
mer Chief Financial Officer of Broadcom Corporation (Broadcom), which
attracted wide attention among the corporate and white-collar bars when a
California federal district court issued a stinging opinion in United States v.
Nicholas.146  The Ninth Circuit’s reversal of Nicholas in United States v. Rue-
hle147 a few months later did nothing to lessen the case’s educational value
for lawyers.
137. Id. at 1210–11.
138. Id. at 1211 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d at 659, and refer-
ring to the corporate employee-corporate counsel privilege test established in In re
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1213.
141. Id. (Lucero, C.J., concurring).
142. Id. (Lucero, C.J., concurring).
143. Id. (Lucero, C.J., concurring).
144. See DESKBOOK ON INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 87, § 1:3.3[B], at
1-11 (explaining that Upjohn warnings are intended “[t]o reinforce explicitly with
the employee that an attorney-client relationship is not being created”).
145. Wagner & Sandifur, supra note 5, at 42–43.
146. 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d sub nom. United States v.
Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
147. 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
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1. The Nicholas and Ruehle Background
In May 2006, an investor group identified Broadcom as one of many
public companies that were backdating employees’ stock options.148  As a
result of related media attention and the prospect of an SEC inquiry,
Broadcom’s board of directors and management decided to investigate
the company’s stock option granting practices.149  Broadcom’s audit com-
mittee engaged the company’s regular outside counsel, Irell & Manella
LLP (Irell), to conduct the investigation, which was known as the “Equity
Review.”150  Ruehle, as Broadcom’s CFO, participated in these plans.151
The audit committee and other Broadcom representatives reportedly
made clear that Broadcom intended to disclose information obtained in
the Equity Review to its outside auditors at Ernst & Young LLP, and “to
fully cooperate with government regulators.”152
Later in May 2006, two lawsuits were filed against Broadcom regard-
ing its stock option granting practices: the “Derivative Action” or the “Mur-
phy Action,” and the “Jin Action.”153  Ruehle was also sued individually in
both cases.154  Irell represented Broadcom and Ruehle in both cases, al-
though it did not obtain Ruehle’s informed consent to its dual representa-
tions as California ethics rules required.155  Irell had previously
represented Ruehle and Broadcom jointly in securities litigation with
proper consent; that representation concluded in 2005.156
On June 1, 2006, Irell lawyers Kenneth Heitz and Dan Lefler met with
Ruehle to discuss Broadcom’s stock option granting practices and his role
in them as CFO.157  Ruehle would later claim that Heitz and Lefler ne-
glected to tell him that they were not his lawyers, nor did they suggest that
he could consult with his own lawyer before talking to them.158  He would
further claim that neither in this meeting nor in following conversations
in June 2006 did they ever advise him that his statements to them would be
disclosed to others.159  Heitz and Lefler would later say that they gave Rue-
hle Upjohn warnings, and that their representation of him in the Jin Action
and Murphy Action did not begin until after the June 1 interview.160
148. Id. at 602.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 602–03.
151. Id. at 602.
152. Id. at 603.
153. Id.; United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112–13 (C.D. Cal.
2009), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
154. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 603.
155. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
156. Id. at 1112.
157. Id. at 1113.  The Irell lawyers had been keeping Ruehle informed about
the progress of the Equity Review.  Indeed, he had received two e-mail status re-
ports from them the day before. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2009).
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There were also conflicting accounts of the later conversations; the district
court indicated that they included discussion of the Jin Action and that
Ruehle sought legal advice from the Irell lawyers about the long-expected
SEC investigation, which had begun on June 13.161  The Ninth Circuit,
however, wrote that “[a]t no point [in the June conversations] did the
topic of the civil securities lawsuits arise as it might relate to Ruehle per-
sonally.  Nor did Ruehle ever indicate . . . that he was seeking legal advice
in his individual capacity.”162
In late June 2006, Broadcom advised Ruehle to obtain independent
counsel in connection with the SEC investigation and the two lawsuits,
which he did.163 Ruehle thereafter remained involved in the Equity Re-
view from a managerial standpoint.164
In August 2006, on Broadcom’s orders, the Irell lawyers shared what
they learned in the Equity Review with Ernst & Young in a series of meet-
ings—some of which Ruehle attended.165  Those disclosures included the
substance of Ruehle’s June 1 interview.166  Later—again at Broadcom’s
direction—Irell shared the same information with the SEC and the local
U.S. Attorney’s office in their investigations of Broadcom.167  In fact, FBI
agents interviewed Heitz and Lefler regarding their conversations with
Ruehle, and summarized those interviews in Form FD-302 memoranda.168
Although Ruehle knew that Broadcom and Irell would be sharing the re-
sults of the Equity Review with Ernst & Young,169 he did not consent to the
disclosure of his conversations with Heitz and Lefler to either Ernst &
Young or to the government.170
In June 2008, a grand jury indicted Ruehle over Broadcom’s backdat-
ing practices.171  In December 2008, Ruehle learned that his statements to
Heitz and Lefler might be used against him when the Form FD-302 memo-
randa summarizing their interviews were produced to him in the criminal
case.172  He objected to the planned use of his statements against him on
attorney–client privilege grounds.173  The district court conducted an ex-
tended evidentiary hearing to determine whether the privilege applied to
Ruehle’s statements to Heitz and Lefler.174
161. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
162. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 604.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
168. Id.
169. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 610–11.
170. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
171. Ruehle, 583 F.3d at 605.
172. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1114.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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2. The District Court Opinion in Nicholas
The district court firmly sided with Ruehle.  According to the district
court, there was “no serious question” that when Ruehle met with Heitz
and Lefler on June 1, 2006, he “reasonably believed that an attorney-client
relationship existed,” that he was speaking with the Irell lawyers for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice, and that any information he shared
with them would be kept confidential.175  Pushing back, the government
argued that because the Irell lawyers gave Ruehle an Upjohn warning, his
statements to them were not privileged.176  The district court shredded
that argument:
[T]he Court has serious doubts whether any Upjohn warning was
given to Mr. Ruehle.  Mr. Ruehle did not remember being given
any warning, no warning is referenced in Mr. Lefler’s notes from
the meeting, and no written record of the warning even ex-
ists. . . . But even if an Upjohn warning were provided to Mr. Rue-
hle, the substance of the warning Mr. Heitz testified he gave
[was] woefully inadequate. . . .  Mr. Heitz testified that he advised
Mr. Ruehle . . . that he and Mr. Lefler were interviewing him on
behalf of Broadcom in connection with their investigation of
Broadcom’s stock option granting practices. . . .  Mr. Heitz fur-
ther testified that he never told Mr. Ruehle that he and Mr. Lef-
ler were not Mr. Ruehle’s lawyers or that Mr. Ruehle should
consult with another lawyer. . . . Most importantly, neither Mr.
Heitz nor Mr. Lefler ever told Mr. Ruehle that any statements he
made to them could be shared with third parties, including the
Government in a criminal investigation of him. . . .
Perhaps most critically, however, whether an Upjohn warning
was or was not given is irrelevant in light of the undisputed attor-
ney-client relationship between Irell and Mr. Ruehle.  An Upjohn
warning is given to a non-client to advise the employee that he is
not communicating with his personal lawyer, no attorney-client
relationship exists, and any communication may be revealed to
third parties. . . .  Here, Mr. Ruehle was represented by Irell in
litigations related to the identical subject matter as Irell’s internal
investigation on behalf of Broadcom.  An oral warning, as op-
posed to a written waiver of the clear conflict presented by Irell’s
representation of both Broadcom and Mr. Ruehle, is simply not
sufficient to suspend or dissolve an existing attorney-client rela-
tionship and to waive the privilege. . . .  An oral warning to a
current client that no attorney-client relationship exists is non-
sensical at best—and unethical at worst.177
175. Id. at 1115.
176. Id. at 1116.
177. Id. at 1116–17 (citations to the record and footnote omitted).
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Moving on, the district court concluded that Irell breached its duty of
loyalty to Ruehle in three ways.178  First, Irell did not obtain Ruehle’s in-
formed written consent to its concurrent representation of him in the Jin
and Murphy Actions on the one hand, and of Broadcom in the Equity
Review on the other hand.179  Second, the Irell lawyers interrogated Rue-
hle, a current client, for the benefit of another current client,
Broadcom.180  Third, Irell disclosed Ruehle’s privileged communications
to Ernst & Young and the government without his consent.181  Ruehle
spoke with Heitz and Lefler expecting confidentiality; he never would
have talked to them had he suspected that they would disclose his state-
ments to the government for use in a criminal case.182  Anyway, he “never
gave Irell permission to jettison his rights for those of Broadcom” and re-
veal the confidential information he shared with Irell to third parties.183
For the Irell lawyers to have done so without his consent “was wrong and a
clear breach of [their] duty of loyalty to him.”184  Their disclosure of his
confidences to the government for use in building a criminal case against
him was especially galling.185
The district court viewed Irell’s “ethical breaches of the duty of loy-
alty” as “very troubling.”186  As a result, it suppressed all evidence reflect-
ing Ruehle’s statements to the Irell lawyers regarding Broadcom’s stock
option granting practices.187  The court also referred Irell to the Califor-
nia State Bar for possible professional discipline.188
3. The Ninth Circuit Opinion in Ruehle
The government took an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s sup-
pression order and the Ninth Circuit considered the matter on an expe-
dited basis.189  In United States v. Ruehle, the Ninth Circuit explained that
because the district court’s conclusion that “Ruehle reasonably believed
that Irell represented him individually with respect to the ongoing civil
lawsuits when the June 1, 2006 meeting took place” was not clearly errone-
ous, it would approach the case “from the perspective that Irell had attor-
ney-client relationships with both Broadcom and Ruehle individually.”190
178. Id. at 1117–21.
179. Id. at 1117–18.
180. Id. at 1119.
181. Id. at 1120–21.
182. Id. at 1121.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. (“Even worse [than disclosure to Ernst & Young], Irell later dis-
closed the same information to the Government as part of its criminal prosecution
of [Ruehle].”).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 2009).
190. Id. at 607.
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That approach did not help Ruehle, however, because the district court
had erred by applying California privilege law rather than federal com-
mon law.191  California law presumes that the attorney-client privilege at-
taches to communications between a lawyer and a client, while under
federal common law, the party asserting the privilege must establish the
privileged nature of any communications.192  Thus, by applying California
law, the district court had improperly burdened the government with
proving what information was not privileged, rather than making Ruehle
prove which information was privileged.193
With the burden of proof properly allocated to Ruehle, it was quickly
apparent that his privilege claim would fail because his statements to the
Irell lawyers “were not ‘made in confidence’ but rather for the purpose of
disclosure to the outside auditors.”194  The record contained ample evi-
dence that Ruehle knew that any factual information the Irell lawyers col-
lected in the Equity Review would be shared with Ernst & Young.195  He
had further testified in the district court that the information he provided
to Heitz and Lefler was predominantly factual and was thus the kind of
information that they would reveal to third parties.196
In an effort “to minimize the damning evidence confirming his aware-
ness that his interactions with Irell would not be held in confidence,” Rue-
hle argued that he would not have cooperated in the Equity Review had
he known that the information he shared with Heitz and Lefler would be
used against him in a criminal prosecution or an SEC enforcement ac-
tion.197  This argument had resonated with the district court, but it fell flat
in the Ninth Circuit.198  The relevant point from an attorney-client privi-
lege perspective was Ruehle’s knowledge that any factual information he
shared with the Irell lawyers would in turn be communicated to Ernst &
Young, which erased the expectation of confidentiality required to invoke
the privilege.199  Ruehle’s subjective surprise that the information he
knew would be shared with Ernst & Young would also be disclosed to the
SEC and federal prosecutors was immaterial.200
Retreating further, Ruehle pointed out that Heitz had testified below
that he could not distinguish between facts relevant to the Equity Review
and facts relevant to Ruehle’s defense in the Jin and Murphy Actions.201
191. Id. at 608–09.
192. Id. at 609.
193. Id. (citing Gordon v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 (Ct. App.
1997)).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 610.
196. Id. at 610–11.
197. Id. at 611.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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Thus, his right to invoke the privilege in the Jin and Murphy Actions trans-
ferred to his communications with the Irell lawyers in connection with the
Equity Review.  But Ruehle’s effective concession that the information un-
derlying the Equity Review and the civil securities cases was inseparable
hurt his cause rather than helping it.202  His knowledge that anything re-
lated to the former would be shared at least with Ernst & Young “de-
stroy[ed] the confidentiality essential to establishing the privilege as to
both.”203
Ruehle tried to argue that while he expected that the Irell lawyers
would reveal factual information learned in the Equity Review to third par-
ties, they would reveal only factual information that was not otherwise priv-
ileged.204  This argument was doomed by his inability to identify which
statements of his should be considered privileged.205  At bottom, Ruehle’s
position was “that some nebulous portion of his communications with
Heitz and Lefler was intended to be confidential as to him personally and
therefore everything said or not said to the attorneys should be protected
by his individual attorney-client privilege.”206  That clearly was not the
law.207  Additionally, Ruehle’s argument ignored “the settled rule that any
voluntary disclosure of information to a third party waives the attorney-
client privilege, regardless of whether such disclosure later turns out to be
harmful.”208
In summary, it was clear to the Ninth Circuit that Ruehle’s statements
to the Irell lawyers were not meant to be confidential but were instead
intended for outside disclosure.209  Ruehle could not prove the existence
of an individual attorney-client privilege that barred the disclosure of his
June 2006 communications with Heitz and Lefler to the government.210
After rejecting Ruehle’s additional argument that the Irell lawyers’ alleged
ethics violations mandated the suppression of his statements to them, the
Ruehle court reversed the district court and remanded the case for trial.211
C. Summary and Recommendations for Lawyers
Although they were ultimately vindicated by the Ninth Circuit in Rue-
hle, the Irell lawyers surely regretted the position in which they found
themselves.  Their experience illustrates the need for lawyers conducting
internal investigations to clearly define their role when interviewing orga-
202. Id. at 611–12.
203. Id. at 612.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 613–14.
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nizational constituents.212  To accomplish that goal, lawyers should start
employee interviews by issuing corporate Miranda or Upjohn warnings that
make several key points.  First, lawyers should tell employees in definite
terms that they represent the organization and not the employees individ-
ually.  Second, they should inform the employees that the interviews are
being conducted for the purpose of providing legal advice to the organiza-
tion.  Conjunctively, they should tell employees that they cannot keep
secrets from the organization; if an employee shares information with
them, they will share that information with the organization.213  Third,
they should tell employees that while their communications are shielded
from discovery by the attorney-client privilege, the organization alone
owns the privilege and may waive it regardless of the employees’ wishes
and without consulting or notifying them.  Fourth, they should instruct
employees to keep their communications confidential.  Fifth, where appli-
cable, they should tell employees that their failure to cooperate in the
investigation violates the organization’s employment policies and is
grounds for discipline, including termination of employment.
As the district court opinion in Nicholas teaches, lawyers should me-
morialize their warnings to employees.214  This is easily done where inter-
views are recorded or a stenographer is present.215  In some cases it may
be preferable to provide employees with a written warning that they must
sign and date before being interviewed.
If offered a second chance, the Irell lawyers would also likely decline
to represent Ruehle individually in the Jin Action and Murphy Action at
the same time that they were representing Broadcom in the Equity Review.
Indeed, concurrent representations often spawn thorny conflicts of
interest.
212. Lawyers should not assume that particular employees do not need corpo-
rate Miranda or Upjohn warnings based on their education, experience, or sophisti-
cation.  Even employees with law degrees or legal backgrounds should receive such
warnings.
213. Lawyers should never tell employees that particular matters are “off the
record,” or promise not to share certain information with the organization.  Em-
ployees may reveal embarrassing (or worse) facts that are irrelevant to the investi-
gation and thus need not be documented or reported, but those decisions can be
made after the employee discloses the information and its relevance or importance
to the investigation can be judged.
214. See United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1114 (C.D. Cal.
2009), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As an
initial matter, the Court has serious doubts whether any Upjohn warning was
given. . . .  Mr. Ruehle did not remember being given any warning, no warning is
referenced in Mr. Lefler’s notes from the meeting, and no written record of the
warning even exists.”).
215. It is rare to record or transcribe employee interviews because verbatim
records of interviews may not qualify for work product protection and they may
otherwise be discoverable by the government in criminal cases.  Turk & Miller,
supra note 87, at 110.
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Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(a) governs concurrent con-
flicts of interest.216  Model Rule 1.7(a) applies when the representation of
a client will be directly adverse to another client, when there is a signifi-
cant risk that a client’s representation will be materially limited by the
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, and when
there is a significant risk that a client’s representation may be materially
limited by the lawyer’s own interests.217  Rule 1.7(a) prohibits concurrent
adverse representations even in wholly unrelated matters.218 For a lawyer
to undertake a representation notwithstanding a concurrent conflict of
interest, she must reasonably believe that she can competently and dili-
gently represent the clients notwithstanding any competing obligations;
the representation cannot be prohibited by law; and she must obtain the
clients’ informed consent, confirmed in writing.219
When considering whether to seek consent, lawyers too often gloss
over the Model Rule 1.7(b)(1) requirement that they “reasonably believe[
]” that they “will be able to provide competent and diligent representation
to each affected client.”220  They do so not because they are unethical, but
because subjectively they cannot imagine any other possibility.  The stan-
dard against which their belief will be measured, however, is an objective
one.221  A lawyer’s subjective, good faith belief that she can fulfill her pro-
fessional obligations to the affected clients notwithstanding any competing
interests or obligations is therefore immaterial.222
216. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
217. Id. r. 1.7(a)(1)–(2).
218. Id. r. 1.7 cmt. 6.
219. Id. r. 1.7(b).
220. Id. r. 1.7(b)(1); see also State ex rel. Horn v. Ray, 325 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2010) (emphasizing that the ability to consent must be resolved as to each
client).
221. Federico v. Lincoln Military Hous., L.L.C., Civ. No. 2:12CV80, 2014 WL
12613388, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 23, 2014); People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133, 136
(Colo. 1997); see Ferolito v. Vultaggio, 949 N.Y.S.2d 356, 363 (App. Div. 2012) (re-
quiring that a “disinterested lawyer” believe that the conflicted lawyer can compe-
tently represent each client’s interests); Ill. Adv. Op. 09-02, 2009 WL 8559340, at *3
(Ill. State Bar Ass’n 2009) (explaining that a “reasonable belief is an objective stan-
dard predicated on what a disinterested lawyer would conclude as to whether the
adverse clients would agree to the dual representation”); N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 2004-02,
2004 WL 2155079, at *3–4 (N.Y.C. Ass’n Bar Comm. Prof’l Judicial Ethics 2004)
(defining the hypothetical, disinterested lawyer in the multiple representation con-
text as someone who “would believe that a single lawyer could competently re-
present the interests of each client”).
222. In re Stein, 177 P.3d 513, 519 (N.M. 2008); see So v. Suchanek, 670 F.3d
1304, 1310–11 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting as irrelevant the attorney’s subjective
belief that his joint representation of the Ponzi scheme victim and the person who
involved the victim in  scheme posed no conflict; rather, the analysis depended on
whether an objective observer having attorney’s knowledge of the situation would
have reasonably doubted his ability to undertake the joint representation); Robert-
son v. Wittenmyer, 763 N.E.2d 804, 807–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that
the lawyer could not have reasonably believed that representing one client against
another was permissible and upholding the lawyer’s disqualification).
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Returning to Ruehle, it is difficult to understand how the Irell lawyers
could have believed that they could both represent Ruehle in the securi-
ties cases and interview him in the Equity Review in which they repre-
sented Broadcom.223  They either knew or reasonably should have known
that Broadcom was adverse to him in the Equity Review, because if
Broadcom’s stock option grants were unlawful, Broadcom might contend
that he was a rogue employee who bore principal responsibility for the
scheme.224  Furthermore, because Broadcom launched the Equity Review
in large part because it anticipated an SEC investigation,225 they knew or
reasonably should have known that Broadcom might turn over to the SEC
and prosecutors the information they collected in their investigation, and
that the government might use information learned from Ruehle as a ba-
sis for criminal charges against him.
Although Ruehle could have consented to the Irell lawyers’ represen-
tation of him while they were concurrently representing Broadcom,226 the
facts were such that Heitz and Lefler would have had to strain to believe
that it was appropriate to even seek his consent.  In short, Irell should have
confined its representation to Broadcom.
In conclusion, lawyers should carefully consider whether to concur-
rently represent a corporate constituent even in a wholly unrelated matter.
In many instances, the potential risks will outweigh any possible rewards.
Furthermore, while lawyers must honestly assess the facts and make a rea-
sonable judgment that competent and diligent representation of both cli-
ents is achievable, best practices dictate that they not make that
determination in isolation.  In other words, they should involve disinter-
ested lawyers in the Rule 1.7(b)(1) analysis.  Additionally, lawyers should
always beware of hindsight applied by courts and clients alike—the failure
to satisfy the competency and diligence standard will trigger a Rule 1.7
violation despite the fact that all affected clients gave informed consent.227
IV. ETHICALLY COMMUNICATING WITH UNREPRESENTED AND REPRESENTED
CONSTITUENTS
As cases involving corporate Miranda or Upjohn warnings reflect, em-
ployees and other organizational constituents with whom investigating law-
223. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-310(C)(3) (STATE BAR OF CAL.
1988) (“A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each cli-
ent . . . Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter
accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse to
the client in the first matter.”).
224. United States v. Nicholas, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2009),
rev’d sub nom. United States v. Ruehle, 583 F.3d 600 (9th Cir. 2009).
225. Id. at 1112.
226. See id. (requiring informed written consent).
227. See, e.g., Sanford v. Virginia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 591, 604 (E.D. Va. 2009)
(finding that the parties’ consent to multiple representation was irrelevant because
no reasonable lawyer could believe that she would be able to provide competent
and diligent representation to each of the affected clients).
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yers communicate are often unrepresented.228  At the same time, they
may have very significant interests at stake.  If employees decline to coop-
erate in the investigation they may be fired.229  If they are guilty of miscon-
duct, they may lose their jobs, be exposed to criminal liability, or face
possible civil liability.  These considerations invite the question of what
lawyers may ethically say to unrepresented employees or constituents.
More narrowly, what may a lawyer ethically say to them if they ask whether
they need lawyers?
On the other side of the coin, employees and other witnesses may
have retained counsel in connection with the investigation.  This poses a
different communication problem for the organization’s lawyers.
A. Communicating with Unrepresented Constituents
Where a person with whom a lawyer wishes to communicate is not
represented by counsel, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.3 governs
the lawyer’s conduct.  Model Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not repre-
sented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer
is disinterested.  When the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s
role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
correct the misunderstanding.  The lawyer shall not give legal ad-
vice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure
counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of
being in conflict with the interests of the client.230
In a nutshell, Model Rule 4.3 recognizes that when a person is unrep-
resented, there is a significant risk that a lawyer will overreach in their
dealings, and it accordingly restricts the lawyer’s ability to unfairly exploit
the situation.231
Model Rule 4.3 distinguishes between situations involving unrepre-
sented persons whose interests may be adverse to the lawyer’s client and
those in which there is no conflict.232  In the former instance, the rule
228. See Sarah H. Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Profes-
sionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 859, 929 (stating that
“[m]ost corporate constituents will not have their own counsel at the time they are
asked to participate in an investigative interview”).
229. See, e.g., Gilman v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 826 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir.
2016) (explaining that a company’s demand that two officers explain their alleged
involvement in criminal activity while on the job in an interview under the penalty
of termination was reasonable, and stating that the company had cause to fire
them for refusing to comply).
230. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
231. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 42.02, at 42-3
(4th ed. 2014 & Supp. 2017).
232. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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assumes that the potential for a lawyer to compromise the unrepresented
person’s interests is so great that the lawyer must be barred from giving
any legal advice other than the advice to obtain counsel.233  Any questions
as to whether a lawyer’s remarks constitute legal advice should be decided
by focusing on what the unrepresented person may reasonably have un-
derstood, rather than on the lawyer’s intent.234  This determination may
be influenced by the person’s experience or sophistication, and by the
context or setting in which the communication occurs.235
Model Rule 4.3 permits a lawyer to advise an unrepresented person
whose interests may conflict with the interests of the lawyer’s client to re-
tain a lawyer, but it does not require a lawyer who thinks such a person
would benefit from counsel to give that advice.236  It is up to the lawyer to
decide whether to advise an unrepresented person to secure counsel.
Employees who are being interviewed in an internal investigation may
ask the investigating lawyers whether they need their own lawyers.  An in-
vestigating lawyer cannot answer “no” if she knows or reasonably should
know that there is a reasonable possibility that the employee’s interests
may conflict with the organization’s interests because that answer would
qualify as legal advice and therefore violate Model Rule 4.3.237  A negative
answer in that situation might also expose a lawyer to discipline for dis-
honesty.238  As a result, the lawyer has three reasonable options.  First, she
may respond by telling the employee that he is not her client and she
therefore cannot give him legal advice.  Second, she may tell the employee
that he should secure counsel.  As a practical matter, however, a lawyer
may be reluctant to give this advice out of the concern that it will cut off
communication with the employee and thereby deprive the organization
of information it might have learned had the interview continued with the
employee being unrepresented.  Third, she may tell the employee that she
does not represent him and that if he wants to consult with a lawyer, she
will adjourn or postpone the interview to allow him to do so.  If the em-
ployee decides to consult with a lawyer, so be it.239  The other lawyer’s
advice to the employee obviously will influence subsequent dealings be-
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Att’y Q v. Miss. State Bar, 587 So. 2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1991) (hold-
ing that the lawyer’s statement, “don’t worry about it,” constituted legal advice
under the circumstances).
235. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
236. Id. r. 4.3.
237. Id.
238. Id. r. 4.1(a) (providing that a lawyer “shall not knowingly . . . make a false
statement of material fact or law to a third person”); id. r. 8.4(c) (prohibiting law-
yers from engaging in conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation”).
239. See generally Paul E. Starkman, When Employees “Lawyer Up,” THE BRIEF,
Spring 2007, at 26 (discussing the pros and cons for an organization when an em-
ployee-witness opts to retain counsel in connection with an internal investigation,
and highlighting the advantageous aspects of that choice).
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tween the employee and the organization.  If, on the other hand, the em-
ployee opts to proceed with the interview unrepresented, that is his
choice.
If a lawyer advises an unrepresented person to secure counsel, there
may be a question as to whether that advice presents a conflict of inter-
est.240  After all, advising an employee or other constituent to consult a
lawyer may be adverse to the organization’s interests because it may dis-
courage or prevent the witness from providing important information to
the organization.241  Fortunately, Model Rule 4.3 answers that question
for lawyers: the answer is no.  Again, Model Rule 4.3 provides that:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not repre-
sented by counsel . . . [a] lawyer shall not give legal advice to
[the] unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure
counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the
interests of [the unrepresented] person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.242
Model Rule 4.3 would not be written as it is if by advising an unrepre-
sented person to secure counsel in the face of a possible conflict of inter-
est a lawyer was simultaneously acting under or creating a conflict of
interest.  That would be an absurd result.  Of course, courts interpret eth-
ics rules according to the same principles that govern statutory interpreta-
tion,243 and courts interpret statutes to avoid absurd results.244  Courts
therefore must interpret ethics rules to avoid absurd results.245  As a re-
sult, courts must interpret Model Rule 4.3 to hold that lawyers who advise
unrepresented individuals to seek counsel do not thereby create conflicts
of interest.
B. Communicating with Represented Constituents and Witnesses
Although organizational constituents who are involved in internal in-
vestigations are frequently unrepresented, some may have personal coun-
sel, as may other witnesses who an investigating lawyer wants to
240. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(governing material limitation conflicts involving current clients).
241. Colin P. Marks, Thompson/McNulty Memo Internal Investigations: Ethical
Concerns of the “Deputized” Counsel, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1065, 1089 (2007).
242. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
243. Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 90 N.E.3d 400, 405 (Ill.
2017); Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Hanna, 513 S.W.3d 175, 178 (Tex. App.
2016).
244. Cen v. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 177, 194 (3d Cir. 2016); Compton Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Addison, 598 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2010); State v. Villamil, 898
N.W.2d 482, 487 (Wis. 2017); Brown v. State, 393 P.3d 1265, 1278 (Wyo. 2017).
245. See Chism v. Tri-State Constr., Inc., 374 P.3d 193, 207 (Wash. Ct. App.
2016) (explaining that it is fundamental for a court to avoid absurd results when
interpreting any rule of professional conduct (quoting In re Marriage of McDer-
mott, 307 P.3d 717, 727 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013)).
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interview.246  When witnesses are represented by counsel, investigating
lawyers run squarely into Model Rule 4.2, which provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows
to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the law-
yer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so
by law or a court order.247
By its terms, Model Rule 4.2 applies only where the lawyer knows that
a person with whom she wishes to communicate is represented in the mat-
ter.  Sometimes the fact of representation is obvious, such as where the
other lawyer has entered her appearance in litigation or otherwise an-
nounced her representation, or the person has stated that he has a lawyer.
Such clarity is not required to violate the rule, however, because a lawyer’s
knowledge can be inferred from circumstances.248  Lawyers cannot avoid
acquiring knowledge by turning a blind eye to facts or circumstances that
indicate a person is represented by counsel.249  Even so, the Rule 4.2
knowledge requirement is plainly one of actual knowledge.250  The fact
that a lawyer should have known that a person was represented in a matter
will not support a Rule 4.2 violation.251
Questions sometimes surface about the existence or scope of a “mat-
ter” within the meaning of Rule 4.2.252  The determination of the exis-
tence or scope of a matter can be crucial because Model Rule 4.2 does not
246. See, e.g., Katie J.M. Baker, Meet the Sexual Assault Adviser Top U.S. Colleges
Have On Speed Dial, BUZZFEED (July 28, 2014), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katie
jmbaker/meet-the-sexual-assault-adviser-top-us-colleges-have-on-spee?utm_term=.
hfZEPx0qP#.nrVoBVWmB [https://perma.cc/L2UX-XK7N] (discussing a case in
which a lawyer conducting an investigation into a sexual assault at Hobart and
William Smith Colleges on behalf of the institution e-mailed the victim, who he
knew to be represented by a lawyer).
247. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
248. Id. r. 1.0(f).
249. People v. Underhill, 353 P.3d 936, 950 (Colo. 2015); Scanlan v. Eisen-
berg, 893 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
250. See, e.g., McClellan v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co. of Erie, Civ. No 13-87
Erie, 2014 WL 4060254, at *1–2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2014) (noting and applying the
actual knowledge requirement); Mori v. Saito, 785 F. Supp. 2d 427, 433 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (rejecting the argument that a lawyer violated Rule 4.2 because she “must
have known” that an unidentified caller was a represented party); State ex rel.
Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Harper, 995 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Okla. 2000) (requiring actual
knowledge and rejecting a “should have known” standard for an alleged Rule 4.2
violation).
251. Harper, 995 P.2d at 1147.
252. See, e.g., Mims v. Chichester, 722 N.Y.S.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 2001) (not-
ing that while multiple matters may involve the same subjects, they remain differ-
ent matters for purposes of the rule); Damron v. CSX Transp., Inc., 920 N.E.2d
169, 177–78 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (reasoning that extrinsic evidence for use in
impeachment was outside the scope of the matter).
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prohibit communications with a represented person outside the scope of
the representation.253
Courts tend to define a matter from a case or representation perspec-
tive rather than from a factual perspective, as demonstrated in People v.
Santiago.254  In Santiago, the question was whether ex parte communica-
tions by prosecutors investigating potential criminal child endangerment
charges against Evelyn Santiago were prohibited by Rule 4.2 because Santi-
ago was represented by appointed counsel in parallel juvenile court pro-
ceedings seeking to have her children made wards of the state.255  Because
it was undisputed that the lawyer representing Santiago in the juvenile
court matter had not been engaged to represent her in the criminal inves-
tigation, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that Rule 4.2 was not vio-
lated despite the overlapping case facts.256  The only “matter” in which
Santiago was represented by counsel was the juvenile court case.257
Consider, then, a situation in which a corporate officer is represented
by a lawyer in commercial litigation in which the corporation has also
been named as a defendant.  If the corporation launches an internal inves-
tigation into related practices about which the officer perhaps knows out
of the concern that those practices may expose it to criminal prosecution
or regulatory action, may the lawyers conducting the investigation inter-
view the officer outside the presence of his defense counsel in the com-
mercial litigation?  Indeed they may, because under Santiago and similar
cases the litigation and the internal investigation are separate matters even
though they share common facts.258  The only matter in which the officer
is represented is the commercial litigation.
253. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
254. 925 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. 2010); see also United States v. Ford, 176 F.3d 376,
382 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that because a government informant communi-
cated with the defendant concerning an offense other than the one for which the
defendant was indicted, there was no Rule 4.2 violation); Griffin-El v. Beard, No.
06-2719, 2009 WL 2929802, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding no Rule 4.2
violation where defense lawyers communicated with a corrections officer in his
role as records custodian when the officer was represented by counsel only in an-
other lawsuit filed by their client, and not in the matter in which his status as a
records custodian made him a potential witness); Miller v. Material Sci. Corp., 986
F. Supp. 1104, 1106–07 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (permitting a communication by the plain-
tiff’s attorney in a federal securities class action with a party that was represented in
a related SEC investigation but not in the federal class action); Miano v. AC&R
Adver., Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that corporate employees
were not off-limits when the corporate entity had not retained any counsel in the
matter that was the focus of the communications); Harper, 995 P.2d at 1147 (Okla.
2000) (reasoning that a defense lawyer’s interview of a driver did not violate Rule
4.2 because it involved a passenger’s separate claim, not other claims arising out of
the same accident in connection with which the driver had counsel).
255. Santiago, 925 N.E.2d at 1123–25.
256. Id. at 1128–31.
257. Id. at 1129–30.
258. See id. at 1130 (stating that “because the drafters of Rule 4.2 did not
include the words ‘subject matter’ or ‘same or a substantially related’ matter in the
rule, we presume that the omission was deliberate”). But see RONALD D. ROTUNDA
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On the other hand, the corporate officer may have retained counsel
to represent him in connection with the internal investigation.  In that
case, the investigating lawyers will need that lawyer’s permission to inter-
view the officer.259
Four remaining points about Model Rule 4.2 are noteworthy.  First,
the rule does not protect a person’s right to counsel; it protects counsel’s
right to participate in any communication between her client and another
lawyer.260  Thus, only the lawyer can invoke Rule 4.2 or consent to ex
parte communications—the client cannot agree to ex parte contact.261
Second, Model Rule 4.2 applies even when the represented person
initiates the communication.262  In that situation, the lawyer must either
avoid the communication or terminate it as soon as practicable after learn-
ing that it is improper.263
Third, a lawyer’s inability to communicate with counsel for a repre-
sented person, such as where the other lawyer is unavailable or unrespon-
sive, does not permit the lawyer to shortcut Rule 4.2 and communicate
with the represented person directly.264
Finally, Rule 4.2 protects against “contacts that are well meaning but
misguided as well as those that are intentionally improper.”265  In In re
& JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 4.2-4, at 997 (2017–2018) (asserting that Rule 4.2 applies where
two matters are related).
259. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
260. State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 1999).
261. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing a
Rule 4.2 analog); Nieves v. OPA, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 887, 895 (N.D. Ill. 2013);
Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 893 F. Supp. 2d 945, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Faison v. Thorn-
ton, 863 F. Supp. 1204, 1213 (D. Nev. 1993) (discussing the Nevada version of Rule
4.2); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Box, 715 N.W.2d 758, 764–65 (Iowa
2006) (construing an analogous rule); Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 464.
262. Scanlan, 893 F. Supp. 2d at 950; United States v. Smallwood, 365 F. Supp.
2d 689, 696 (E.D. Va. 2005); Pleasant Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Carrasco, 870 A.2d 443, 446
(R.I. 2005); Engstrom v. Goodman, 271 P.3d 959, 964 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396, at 16 (1995). But cf.
United States v. Guivas-Soto, 124 F. Supp. 3d 72, 74 (D.P.R. 2015) (concluding that
a prosecutor did not violate Rule 4.2 by reading two letters sent to him by a repre-
sented defendant because Model Rule 4.2 “prohibits only communication by the
lawyer, and reading a letter does not communicate anything”).
263. See, e.g., Zaug v. Va. State Bar, 737 S.E.2d 914, 917–19 (Va. 2013) (con-
cluding that the lawyer did not violate Rule 4.2 when the opposing party called and
then launched into an emotional outburst, and the lawyer could not reasonably
terminate the conversation immediately; the requirement to disengage from an
unrepresented person’s communication does not require a lawyer to be discourte-
ous or impolite).
264. In re Garcia, 147 P.3d 132, 134–35 (Kan. 2006); see, e.g., In re Eddings,
782 S.E.2d 445, 445 (Ga. 2017) (violating Rule 4.2 by communicating with repre-
sented individuals on the eve of trial when a critical deadline was imminent, and
the lawyer had unsuccessfully attempted to contact their lawyers).
265. Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Kent, 653 A.2d 909, 918 (Md. 1995).
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Capper,266 for example, a lawyer who represented a husband in a child
custody matter prepared a custody agreement for his client to deliver to
his ex-wife for execution based on his client’s mistaken representation that
his ex-wife was not using a lawyer in the matter to save money.267  The
lawyer knew that the ex-wife had previously been represented in post-disso-
lution matters.268  And, in fact, the ex-wife was represented in this matter,
such that the lawyer violated Rule 4.2 through his client.269  Because no
one was harmed and the lawyer’s violation derived from his client’s erro-
neous assertion, the lawyer received only a public reprimand for his mis-
conduct.270  The In re Capper court noted, however, that this case was “a
vivid reminder that lawyers should independently verify that opposing par-
ties wishing to communicate directly with them are in fact not represented
by counsel, especially where the lawyer knows that the party had previously
been represented in the matter.”271
C. Summary
For investigating lawyers who do not know whether an employee or
witness is represented by counsel in connection with the investigation, the
best course of action is to ask whether this is the case at the start of the
interview or before.  If the person is represented, the interview cannot go
forward without the other lawyer’s permission or presence.272  The organi-
zation’s perceived right to compel an employee’s cooperation in the inves-
tigation does not alter the lawyers’ ethical obligations.273  If the employee
or witness is not represented by counsel with respect to the investigation,
then the investigating lawyers will know that their conduct is governed by
Rule 4.3 and can proceed accordingly.
V. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT IMMUNITY
Internal investigations involve sensitive matters.  The results of an in-
vestigation may be relevant to the organization’s potential civil or criminal
liability.  The organization’s board of directors and executives may rely on
the investigative record to analyze and respond to legal threats to the or-
ganization.  At the same time, potential adversaries—including, in some
cases, the government—are acutely interested in obtaining investigative
266. 757 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 2001).
267. Id. at 139.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 140.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
273. See generally id. r. 5.2(a) (“A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional
Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another
person.”).
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materials for use against the organization.274  In short, there are many
reasons for an organization to want to keep the results of an internal inves-
tigation and information learned during the inquiry confidential.  The
two primary bases for doing so are the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine.  Responsibility for asserting the privilege and work
product immunity, and for ensuring that they are not waived or otherwise
lost, principally rests with the organization’s lawyers.  It is therefore essen-
tial for lawyers to understand key contours of the attorney-client privilege
and work product immunity.
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest common law privi-
leges protecting confidential communications,275 and it is now widely
codified.276  The best-known privilege test was announced nearly seventy
years ago in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.277  The United Shoe
test famously provides that the privilege applies if:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a)
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c)
for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceed-
ing, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by
the client.278
274. See, e.g., Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 384, 390–97 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (rejecting the defendant’s claims that information gathered during its inter-
nal investigation was privileged or constituted work product, and granting the
plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery).
275. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Ind. Elec. Workers Pension Tr. Fund IBEW, 95 A.3d 1264, 1278 (Del.
2014); Worley v. Cent. Fla. YMCA, Inc., 228 So. 3d 18, 24 (Fla. 2017); Ctr. Partners,
Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, L.L.C., 981 N.E.2d 345, 355 (Ill. 2012); Wemark v. State,
602 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1999); State v. Gonzalez, 234 P.3d 1, 12 (Kan. 2010);
Suffolk Constr. Co. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 870 N.E.2d 33, 38 (Mass. 2007)
(quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); Ambac Assur.
Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 34 (N.Y. 2016); In re Miller,
584 S.E.2d 772, 782 (N.C. 2003); Frease v. Glazer, 4 P.3d 56, 60 (Or. 2000); Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1263 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); In re XL
Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex. 2012) (quoting United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989)); Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1999).
276. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 950–62 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2015);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (2015); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5928 (2016).
277. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
278. Id. at 358–59.
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Although the United Shoe test implies that the privilege covers only
communications from the client to the attorney, confidential communica-
tions from an attorney to a client are also privileged.279  The attorney-
client privilege is a two-way street.
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers articulates
the elements of the attorney-client privilege more succinctly.280  Section
68 provides that the privilege attaches “to: (1) a communication (2) made
between privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of ob-
taining or providing legal assistance for the client.”281  “Privileged per-
sons” include the client or prospective client, the lawyer, agents of the
client or prospective client and the lawyer who facilitate communications
between them, and agents of the lawyer who assist in the client’s
representation.282
The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client.283  When a lawyer
invokes the privilege, she does so as the client’s agent—not as a holder of
the privilege.284
Because the privilege attaches to communications, an otherwise privi-
leged exchange between a client and a lawyer containing information that
could be discovered by other means remains shielded from discovery.285
There is, however, no blanket privilege covering all attorney-client com-
279. United States v. Christensen, 801 F.3d 970, 1007 (9th Cir. 2015) (apply-
ing federal privilege law); Byrd v. State, 929 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Ark. 1996); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 730 A.2d 51, 60 (Conn. 1999); Clausen v.
Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 137–38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); People v.
Radojcic, 998 N.E.2d 1212, 1221 (Ill. 2013); Squealer Feeds v. Pickering, 530
N.W.2d 678, 684 (Iowa 1995); Rent Control Bd. v. Praught, 619 N.E.2d 346, 350
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993); Shorter v. State, 33 So. 3d 512, 516 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)
(quoting Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Miss. 2003)); Palmer v. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 906 (Mont. 1993); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 341 (Nev. 2017); Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 59
(Pa. 2011); Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 533 (R.I. 2008) (quoting
Mortg. Guar. & Title Co. v. Cunha, 745 A.2d 156, 158–59 (R.I. 2000)); Boyd v.
Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002); Zink v. City of
Mesa, 256 P.3d 384, 403 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011); State ex rel. Montpelier U.S. Ins.
Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788, 994 (W. Va. 2014) (quoting FRANKLIN D. CLECKLEY ET
AL., LITIGATION HANDBOOK ON WEST VIRGINIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 26(b)(1), at 693 (4th ed. 2012)).
280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
281. Id.
282. Id. § 70.
283. Holt v. McCastlain, 182 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Ark. 2004); OXY Res. Cal.
L.L.C. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 644–45 (Ct. App. 2004); Ctr. Partners, Ltd.
v. Growth Head GP, L.L.C., 981 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ill. 2012); Att’y Grievance
Comm’n of Md. v. Powers, 164 A.3d 138, 151 (Md. 2017); Arnoldy v. Mahoney, 791
N.W.2d 645, 657 (S.D. 2010); In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Tex.
2012).
284. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 26.
285. Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 219 P.3d 736, 741 (Cal. 2009).
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munications.286  The client must assert the privilege with respect to each
communication in question, and the court hearing the matter must scruti-
nize each one independently.287  The party asserting the privilege bears
the burden of establishing its application to particular communica-
tions.288  This is a fact-specific inquiry.289
A party seeking to protect written or electronic communications from
discovery does not have to identify them as “privileged” or “confidential”
for the attorney-client privilege to attach.290  On the other hand, a party
cannot shield a communication from discovery simply by branding it “con-
fidential” or “privileged.”291  Similarly, a client cannot cloak a communica-
tion in the attorney-client privilege simply by routing it through a
lawyer.292  Rather, a communication must bear all of the hallmarks of the
privilege for it to be protected.293
286. DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1199
(Colo. 2013); see also Scott v. Peterson, 126 P.3d 1232, 1234 (Okla. 2005) (“[T]he
mere status of an attorney-client relationship does not make every communication
between attorney and client protected by the privilege.”).
287. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 197 (Colo. 2001); Brown v. Katz, 868
N.E.2d 1159, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
288. Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 496, 502 (Fed. Cl. 2010);
Wesp, 33 P.3d at 198; In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 561 (Del. Ch.
2014) (quoting Moyer v. Moyer, 602 A.2d 68, 72 (Del. 1992)); Lender Processing
Servs., Inc. v. Arch Ins. Co., 183 So. 3d 1052, 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Kirk v.
Ford Motor Co., 116 P.3d 27, 34 (Idaho 2005); Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154,
161, 163 (Ky. 2012); Maldonado v. Kiewit La. Co., 152 So. 3d 909, 927 (La. Ct. App.
2014); Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe, 151 A.3d 7, 16 (Me. 2016); Clair v. Clair,
982 N.E.2d 32, 40–41 (Mass. 2013); State ex rel. Koster v. Cain, 383 S.W.3d 105, 116
(Mo. Ct. App. 2012); State ex rel. AMISUB, Inc. v. Buckley, 618 N.W.2d 684, 694
(Neb. 2000); Bhandari v. Artesia Gen. Hosp., 317 P.3d 856, 860 (N.M. Ct. App.
2013); Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 34
(N.Y. 2016); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004);
State ex rel. HCR Manorcare, L.L.C. v. Stucky, 776 S.E.2d 271, 282 (W. Va. 2015);
Dishman v. First Interstate Bank, 362 P.3d 360, 367 (Wyo. 2015).
289. State ex rel. Koster, 383 S.W.3d at 118.
290. See, e.g., Baptiste v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., No. 03Civ2102(RCC)
(THK), 2004 WL 330235, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2004) (rejecting the argument
that failing to label an e-mail message as privileged deprived it of privileged status);
Blumenthal v. Kimber Mfg. Co., 826 A.2d 1088, 1098 (Conn. 2003) (discussing e-
mail and stating that “[w]hether a document expressly is marked as ‘confidential’
is not dispositive, but is merely one factor a court may consider in determining
confidentiality”); Chrysler Corp. v. Sheridan, No. 227511, 2001 WL 773099, at *3
(Mich. Ct. App. July 10, 2001) (involving the inadvertent disclosure of an e-mail
message that was not identified as “privileged” or “confidential”).
291. Blumenthal, 826 A.2d at 1098.
292. Stopka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 816 F. Supp. 2d 516, 528 (N.D. Ill.
2011) (quoting Equity Residential v. Kendall Risk Mgmt., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 557, 563
(N.D. Ill. 2007)); Opus Corp. v. IBM Corp., 956 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Minn.
1996); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp., 852 F. Supp. 156, 160
(E.D.N.Y. 1994); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Westmoreland-LG & E Partners, 526
S.E.2d 750, 755 (Va. 2000).
293. Stopka, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
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The attorney-client privilege benefits organizations as well as individu-
als.294  In the organizational context, a common problem is determining
who among the entity’s employees speaks on its behalf.  Courts have tradi-
tionally applied two tests to analyze organizational privilege claims: the
“control group” test and the “subject matter” test.  A few courts have
adopted a third test that closely tracks the subject matter test, and which is
sometimes called the “modified subject matter test.”295
Applying the control group test, communications must be made by an
employee who is positioned “to control or take a substantial part in the
determination of corporate action in response to legal advice” for the priv-
ilege to attach.296  Only these employees qualify as the “client” for attor-
ney-client privilege purposes.297
In comparison, under the subject matter test, a lawyer’s communica-
tion with any employee may be privileged if it is intended to secure legal
advice for the corporation, the employee is communicating with the law-
yer at a superior’s request or direction, and the employee’s responsibilities
include the subject of the communication.298  Applying this test, the em-
ployee’s position or rank is irrelevant to the privilege analysis.299  The Su-
preme Court embraced the subject matter approach in Upjohn Co. v.
United States,300 although it declined to formulate a specific test.301  Re-
gardless, it is clear following Upjohn that under the subject matter test, a
lawyer’s confidential communications with any employee are privileged
when they concern matters within the scope of the employee’s responsibil-
ities and the employee knows the communications are intended to enable
or facilitate the lawyer’s representation of the corporation.302
294. See, e.g., Harris Mgmt., Inc. v. Coulombe, 151 A.3d 7, 15 (Me. 2016) (stat-
ing that the attorney-client privilege is “available to individuals, corporations, and
other entities”).
295. See, e.g., Baisley v. Missiquoi Cemetary Ass’n, 708 A.2d 924, 931 (Vt. 1998)
(following Upjohn, the subject-matter test and the modified subject-matter test de-
fine the client in the corporate context).
296. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 189.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
301. Id. at 396.
302. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. L.L.C. v. Cieslak, Nos. 2:15-cv-01189-
JAD-GWF, 2:13-cv-00596-JAD-GWF, 2015 WL 4773585, at *8 (D. Nev. Aug. 13,
2015) (“Upjohn holds that the privilege applies to communications with corporate
employees, regardless of their position, when the communications concern mat-
ters within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties and the employee is aware
that the information is being furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal
advice to the corporation.”); MGA Entm’t, Inc. v. Nat’l Prods. Ltd., No. CV 10-
07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 WL 3150532, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (“According to
the Supreme Court, the privilege applies to communications by any corporate em-
ployee regardless of position when the communications concern matters within
the scope of the employee’s duties and the employee is aware that the information
is being furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corpora-
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The third test is often referred to as the “modified Harper & Row test,”
or the “Diversified Industries test,” after the federal cases from which it de-
rives: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,303 and Diversified Industries,
Inc. v. Meredith.304  Again, as noted earlier, some courts describe it as the
modified subject matter test.305  Under this test:
The attorney-client privilege [applies] to an employee’s commu-
nication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of
securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communica-
tion did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the su-
perior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.306
The modified Harper & Row test or Diversified Industries test is basically
the subject matter test with the “need to know” factor added, hence the
modified subject matter test label.
Courts narrowly or strictly construe the attorney-client privilege be-
cause it limits full disclosure of the truth.307  For example, the privilege
does not shield from discovery the mere fact that an attorney-client rela-
tionship exists, when that relationship began, the general nature of the
services for which the client retained the attorney, or the terms and condi-
tions of the attorney’s engagement.308  While the privilege protects the
tion.”); United States v. Ghavami, 882 F. Supp. 2d 532, 538–39 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(explaining that “the attorney-client privilege protects communications by corpo-
rate employees to counsel for the corporation who is acting as a lawyer, as long as
the communications are made at the direction of corporate superiors in order to
secure legal advice and the employees are aware that they are being questioned in
connection with the provision of such advice”).
303. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
304. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
305. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
306. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Diversified
Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977)).
307. In re Pac. Pictures Corp., 679 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012); PSE Con-
sulting, Inc. v. Frank Mercede & Sons, Inc., 838 A.2d 135, 167 (Conn. 2004); Ctr.
Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, L.L.C., 981 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ill. 2012); In re
Bryan, 61 P.3d 641, 656 (Kan. 2003); Clair v. Clair, 982 N.E.2d 32, 40 (Mass. 2013);
Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d 240, 245
(Mont. 2012); Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d
30, 34 (N.Y. 2016); Walton v. Mid-Atl. Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 549
(Va. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, 370 S.E.2d 296, 301 (Va. 1988));
Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, 798 (Wis. 2002) (quoting
cases).
308. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir.
1977) (rejecting the attorney-client privilege with respect to a law firm memoran-
dum); State ex rel. Koster v. Cain, 383 S.W.3d 105, 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he
great weight of authority on the subject recognizes that with rare exception, the
mere fact of the existence of a relationship between an attorney and a client, and
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content of attorney-client communications from disclosure, it does not
prevent disclosure of the facts communicated.309  Those facts remain dis-
coverable by other means.310  Nor does the attorney-client privilege shield
from discovery or communications in which an attorney is giving business
advice rather than legal advice.311  These essential principles are as true in
internal investigation cases as they are elsewhere.312
Finally, the attorney-client privilege may be waived either voluntarily
or by implication.313  The most obvious example of a waiver is a client’s
intentional revelation of otherwise privileged information to a third party
who is not necessary to the client’s representation.314  The party seeking
to overcome the privilege generally bears the burden of establishing a
waiver,315 although some courts hold that that the party asserting the privi-
lege bears the burden of establishing that it has not been waived.316
the nature of the fee arrangements between the attorney and a client are not attor-
ney-client privileged communications.”); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501,
531–32 (Pa. 2005) (determining that a fee arrangement with a lawyer was not privi-
leged). But see L.A. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors v. Super. Ct., 386 P.3d 773, 783 (Cal.
2016) (concluding that a lawyer’s invoice for work “in active and ongoing litiga-
tion” is privileged); State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local Sch. Dist., 959
N.E.2d 524, 529–30 (Ohio 2011) (explaining that to the extent narrative portions
of attorney fee statements describe legal services performed for a client, they are
privileged because they represent communications from the attorney to the client
about matters for which the attorney was retained).
309.  N.J. v. Sprint Corp., 258 F.R.D. 421, 426 (D. Kan. 2009) (quoting Wil-
liams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 03–2200, 2006 WL 1867478, at *10 (D. Kan.
July 1, 2006)); Hagans v. Gatorland Kubota, L.L.C./Sentry Ins., 45 So. 3d 73, 76
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012); Wynn
Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 341 (Nev. 2017); W. Hori-
zons Living Ctrs. v. Feland, 853 N.W.2d 36, 41 (N.D. 2014); DeCurtis v. Visconti,
Boren & Campbell, Ltd., 152 A.3d 413, 424 (R.I. 2017); Snow, Christensen & Mar-
tineau v. Lindberg, 299 P.3d 1058, 1070 (Utah 2013); Newman v. Highland Sch.
Dist. No. 203, 381 P.3d 1188, 1191 (Wash. 2016).
310. Collins, 384 S.W.3d at 159.
311. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376, 380 (W.D. Va. 2012) (applying
Virginia law); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Super. Ct., 219 P.3d 736, 743 (Cal. 2009);
Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 78 n.8 (Pa. 2011).
312. See, e.g., Koumoulis v. Indep. Fin. Mktg. Grp., Inc., 295 F.R.D. 28, 45
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that an investigating lawyer’s communications with
human resources staff were not privileged because “their predominant purpose
was to provide human resources and thus business advice, not legal advice”).
313. Cormack v. United States, 118 Fed. Cl. 39, 43 n.3 (Fed. Cl. 2014); People
v. Curren, 348 P.3d 467, 480 (Colo. App. 2014).
314. See Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d
240, 245 (Mont. 2012) (noting that disclosure to third parties waives the privilege
unless it is necessary for the client to obtain informed legal advice).
315. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 198 (Colo. 2001); Yocabet v. UPMC Pres-
byterian, 113 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015); Andrews v. Ridco, Inc., 863
N.W.2d 540, 547 (S.D. 2015); McAfee v. State, 467 S.W.3d 622, 643 (Tex. App.
2015); State ex rel. Med. Assur. of W. Va., Inc. v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 80, 89 (W. Va.
2003).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Bolander, 722 F.3d 199, 222 (4th Cir. 2013); In
re Grand Jury Investig., 902 N.E.2d 929, 932 (Mass. 2009); Ambac Assur. Corp. v.
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B. Work Product Immunity
In addition to the attorney-client privilege, key information may be
protected as confidential under the work product doctrine.  The attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine are separate and dis-
tinct.317  Although courts and lawyers alike often describe the work prod-
uct doctrine as the “work product privilege,” it is actually a form of
qualified immunity.318
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which is the client’s to assert, it is
commonly said that the lawyer holds work product immunity.319  It is un-
questionably true that a lawyer may assert work product immunity on her
own behalf.320  But in fact, both the lawyer and the client hold work prod-
uct immunity, and either may assert it to avoid discovery.321  Similarly, ei-
ther the client or the lawyer may waive work product immunity, although
only with respect to herself.322
A party claiming work product protection bears the burden of estab-
lishing that it applies to the information at issue.323  “As with the attorney-
client privilege, an assertion that a document [or other information] is
protected by the work product doctrine must be established by specific
facts and not conclusory statements.”324  A party “cannot create work
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y. 2016); Walton v. Mid-Atl.
Spine Specialists, P.C., 694 S.E.2d 545, 549 (Va. 2010).
317. Doe v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 34 N.E.3d 652, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)
(quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill.
1991)); Elkton Care Ctr. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Quality Care Mgmt., Inc., 805 A.2d
1177, 1183 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
318. Anderson v. Marsh, 312 F.R.D. 584, 592 (E.D. Cal. 2015); Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Clean River Corp., 631 S.E.2d 879, 884 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Velez v. Dick Keffer Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 551 S.E.2d 873, 876 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001)).
319. OXY Res. Cal. L.L.C. v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 645 (Ct. App.
2004); Clausen v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1997).
320. Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir.
2010).
321. In re Naranjo, 768 F.3d 332, 344 & n.17 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas, 561 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 924 n.15 (8th Cir. 1997); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347 (Nev. 2017).
322. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 43 F.3d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1994); see also
Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006) (suggesting, however, that a
lawyer might be forced to surrender work product following a client’s waiver if the
lawyer’s insistence on confidentiality harmed the client).
323. Vicor Corp. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 674 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2012); Solis v.
Food Emp’rs Labor Relations Ass’n, 644 F.3d 221, 232 (4th Cir. 2011).
324. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., 285 F.R.D. 376, 382 (W.D. Va. 2012).
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product solely by the nomenclature used to entitle documents.”325  Simply
branding a document as “work product” does not make it so.326
Work product protection is broader than that conferred by the attor-
ney-client privilege in terms of the range of information it shields from
discovery.327  Work product immunity is not limited, as is the attorney-
client privilege, to confidential communications between an attorney and
a client.328  The work product doctrine protects lawyers’ effective trial
preparation by immunizing certain information from discovery, including
materials prepared by attorneys’ agents and consultants.329
In addition, and consistent with the purposes and contours of the
work product doctrine generally, work product immunity is not necessarily
waived by disclosure to a third-party.330  Rather, for disclosure to a third
party to waive work product protection, the third party must be an adver-
sary or a conduit to an adversary.331
There are two categories of attorney work product: “fact” or “ordi-
nary” work product, but better described as “tangible” work product; and
“opinion” or “core” work product, also termed “intangible” work product.
To qualify as tangible work product, the material sought to be protected
must be a document or tangible thing prepared in anticipation of litiga-
325. Henderson v. Newport Cty. Reg’l YMCA, 966 A.2d 1242, 1249 (R.I.
2009).
326. See, e.g., In re Google Inc., 462 F. App’x 975, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (disre-
garding the description of an e-mail message as containing work product in light
of the content of the message); Ledgin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan. City,
166 F.R.D. 496, 499 (D. Kan. 1996) (describing a party’s document stamp of “attor-
ney work product” as a “self-serving embellishment” that did not preclude
discovery).
327. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d
289, 304 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th
Cir. 1986)); 100 Harborview Dr. Condo. Council of Unit Owners v. Clark, 119 A.3d
87, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015); Draggin’ Y Cattle Co. v. Addink, 312 P.3d 451,
460 (Mont. 2013); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347
(Nev. 2017); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 64 A.3d 1183, 1192 (R.I. 2013).
328. Reg’l Airport Auth. of Louisville v. LFG, L.L.C., 460 F.3d 697, 713 (6th
Cir. 2006).
329. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 2003)
(protecting communications with a party’s trial strategy and deposition prepara-
tion consultant).
330. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings #3, 847 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir.
2017) (stating that although the target of a grand jury investigation, Doe, “waived
the attorney-client privilege by forwarding the email to his accountant, the docu-
ment still retained its work-product status because it was used to prepare for Doe’s
case against those suing him”); United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d 461,
468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no waiver of work product immunity where the
defendant forwarded an e-mail message from her lawyer to her adult daughter,
who was her closest confidante); In re Lake Lotawana Cmty. Improvement Dist.,
563 B.R. 909, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2016) (stating that “[m]ere disclosure to a
third party” does not waive work product immunity and concluding that disclosure
to a mediator is not a waiver).
331. O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 313–18 (N.J. 2014); Lead
Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 64 A.3d at 1196.
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tion by or for a party, or by or for the party’s representative.332  “Opinion”
work product refers to an attorney’s conclusions, legal theories, mental
impressions, or opinions.333
The work product doctrine is codified in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(3) and its state counterparts.334  Rule 26(b)(3) provides in
pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things oth-
erwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party’s representative (including the
other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party’s
case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to ob-
tain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
In ordering discovery of such materials when the required show-
ing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.335
As with the attorney-client privilege, work product protection is not
absolute and may be waived,336 although conduct that waives the privilege
may not waive work product immunity.337  Consequently, any alleged
waiver of the two doctrines must be analyzed separately.338
As for the principle that work product immunity is not absolute, con-
sider, for example, that it does not shield from discovery facts known by or
332.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
333. State ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O’Malley, 898 S.W.2d
550, 552 (Mo. 1995).
334. Because the work product doctrine has been codified in Rule 26, in fed-
eral courts, work product immunity is governed by the uniform federal standard
even in diversity cases.  Pemberton v. Republic Servs., Inc., 308 F.R.D. 195, 200
(E.D. Mo. 2015); Feld v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 2d 242, 247 (D.D.C.
2013) (quoting United Coal Cos. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 966 (3d Cir.
1988)).
335.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
336. Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010); In re
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301-02 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ardon v. City
of Los Angeles, 366 P.3d 996, 1001 (Cal. 2016).
337. Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 280 P.3d 240,
248 (Mont. 2012).
338. In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(quoting EDNA S. EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PROD-
UCT DOCTRINE 1027 (5th ed. 2007)); Doe v. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 34 N.E.3d
652, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (quoting Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins.
Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1991)).
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shared with a lawyer.339  Moreover, as Rule 26(b)(3) makes clear, a party
may discover its adversary’s tangible work product if it demonstrates sub-
stantial need of the materials to prepare its case and it is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means.340
In comparison to tangible work product, opinion work product re-
ceives almost absolute protection against discovery.341  To discover an ad-
versary’s opinion work product, a party must demonstrate something far
greater than the substantial need and undue hardship necessary to obtain
tangible work product.342  Opinion work product is discoverable only if
the attorneys’ conclusions, mental impressions, or opinions are at issue in
339. Meltzer Contracting Co. L.L.C. v. Stephens, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1204
(D. Haw. 2009); Whitlow v. Martin, 259 F.R.D. 349, 354 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
340. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).  In contrast, communications protected by the
attorney-client privilege do not become discoverable by virtue of the inquiring
party’s inability to obtain the information from other sources.  St. Luke Hosps.,
Inc. v. Kopowski, 160 S.W.3d 771, 776–77 (Ky. 2005).  Nor are privileged materials
discoverable based on the requesting party’s “substantial need.” See United States
v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S.
Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1494–95 (9th Cir. 1989)); United States v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 132 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (explaining that the attorney-client
privilege cannot be overcome by a showing of sufficient need); Hagans v. Gator-
land Kubota, L.L.C./Sentry Ins., 45 So. 3d 73, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (refer-
ring to “need”); Collins v. Braden, 384 S.W.3d 154, 159 (Ky. 2012) (referring to
“great need and hardship”).  Likewise, “undue hardship” cannot be invoked to
overcome the attorney-client privilege. Hagans, 45 So. 3d at 76.
341. Drummond Co. v. Conrad & Sherer, L.L.P., 885 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th
Cir. 1994)); Smith v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 743, 746 (4th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999)); Republic of
Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 869 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Deloitte L.L.P., 610 F.3d 129, 135 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); Deloitte L.L.P., 610 F.3d at 135
(noting the characterization of opinion work product as “ ‘virtually undiscover-
able’” (quoting Director, Office of Thrift Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.,
124 F.3d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 343 F.3d
658, 663 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 962 n.7 (3d
Cir. 1997)); In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (characterizing opin-
ion work product as “ ‘virtually undiscoverable’” (quoting Director, 124 F.3d at
1307); see also Scott v. Peterson, 126 P.3d 1232, 1235 (Okla. 2005) (stating that
opinion work product “is not discoverable except in extraordinary circum-
stances”). But cf. Chua v. Johnson, 784 S.E.2d 449, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016) (“Un-
like the qualified privilege afforded other work product, opinion work product is
entitled to an absolute privilege and is therefore absolutely protected from disclo-
sure.”); TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling, 15 N.E.3d 985, 995 (Ind. 2014) (noting
that opinion work product is not discoverable); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347 (Nev. 2017) (quoting an earlier Nevada case in
explaining that opinion work product is undiscoverable); Henderson v. Newport
Cty. Reg’l YMCA, 966 A.2d 1242, 1247 (R.I. 2009) (stating that opinion work prod-
uct is absolutely immune from discovery).
342. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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the case and there is a compelling need for their discovery.343  The cir-
cumstances in which this test is met are exceptional and rare.344
In contrast to the attorney-client privilege, which is not limited to liti-
gation-related communications,345 materials must be generated or pre-
pared “in anticipation of litigation” to qualify as work product.346
Materials prepared in anticipation of litigation retain their work product
immunity even if litigation never ensues.347  Documents prepared in the
ordinary course of business, or that would have been prepared regardless
of anticipated litigation, however, do not constitute work product.348
As the anticipation of litigation requirement signals, work product im-
munity attaches before litigation is initiated.349  In fact, it is “not necessary
that litigation be threatened or imminent, as long as the prospect of litiga-
tion is identifiable because of claims that have already arisen.”350  Some
courts state the “anticipation of litigation” requirement a bit differently,
holding that work product immunity attaches if there is “a substantial
probability that litigation will ensue.”351  Regardless of the test employed,
the remote prospect of litigation will not bring the work product doctrine
into play.352
343. Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir.
1992).
344. In re Cendant Corp., 343 F.3d at 663; Henderson v. Holiday CVS, L.L.C.,
269 F.R.D. 682, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (quoting Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie,
17 F.3d 1386, 1422 (11th Cir. 1994)).
345. In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App. 1999).
346. Save Sunset Beach Coal. v. City of Honolulu, 78 P.3d 1, 20 (Haw. 2003);
Brown v. Katz, 868 N.E.2d 1159, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Wichita Eagle & Bea-
con Pub. Co. v. Simmons, 50 P.3d 66, 85 (Kan. 2002); Miller v. J.B. Hunt Transp.,
Inc., 770 A.2d 1288, 1291–93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); State ex rel. Branden-
burg v. Blackmer, 110 P.3d 66, 69 (N.M. 2005); Scott v. Peterson, 126 P.3d 1232,
1235 (Okla. 2005); Henderson v. Newport Cty. Reg’l YMCA, 966 A.2d 1242, 1247
(R.I. 2009); State ex rel. Montpelier U.S. Ins. Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788, 799–800
(W. Va. 2014) (quoting State ex rel. Erie Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Mazzone, 684 S.E.2d
31, 40 (W. Va. 2007)). But see Laguna Beach Cty. Water Dist. v. Super. Ct., 22 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 387, 393 (Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that California law has no “anticipa-
tion of litigation” requirement); Estate of Paterno v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 168 A.3d 187, 201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (rejecting the assertion that under
Pennsylvania law the work product doctrine is limited to materials prepared in
anticipation of litigation).
347. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 1167.
348. Solis v. Food Emp’rs Labor Relations Ass’n, 644 F.3d 221, 232 (4th Cir.
2011) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980,
984 (4th Cir. 1992)); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
349. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 64 A.3d 1183, 1193 (R.I. 2013).
350. Nat’l Tank Co. v. 30th Judicial Dist. Ct., 851 S.W.2d 193, 205 (Tex.
1993).
351. Wichita Eagle & Beacon, 50 P.3d at 85.
352. Lamar Advert. of S.D., Inc. v. Kay, 267 F.R.D. 568, 577–78 (D.S.D. 2010);
Sajda v. Brewton, 265 F.R.D. 334, 339 (N.D. Ind. 2009) (quoting Binks Mfg. Co. v.
Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983)).
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Finally, materials said to be work product may have been prepared for
multiple purposes.  For example, a lawyer may create documents for a bus-
iness purpose and in anticipation of litigation.  Because courts approach
this problem in one of two ways, the result in such a case depends on the
jurisdiction.  In some jurisdictions, a court must discern the primary moti-
vating purpose behind the documents’ creation.353  “If the primary moti-
vating purpose is other than to assist in pending or impending litigation,”
then the materials are not protected as work product.354  Other courts
have abandoned the primary motivating purpose test for a “because of”
test.355  Using this test, the “work product doctrine can reach documents
prepared ‘because of litigation’ even if they were prepared in connection
with a business transaction or also served a business purpose.”356  Regard-
less of the test applied, this is a case- and fact-specific inquiry.357
C. The Waiver Threat
As already noted, a party may waive the attorney-client privilege and
work product immunity.  In the internal investigations context, “[t]here
are many reasons, ranging from leniency under the Sentencing Guidelines
to restoration of the corporate image, that a client may decide to waive the
attorney-client privilege.”358  A waiver may be necessary where the internal
investigation relates to the organization’s relationship or involvement with
various federal agencies or programs.359  But while “waiver” is generally
understood to refer to the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known right or privilege, waiver in the attorney-client privilege and work
353. Laney ex rel. Laney v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 562, 566
(N.D. Okla. 2009); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 90 Civ.1260 (SS), 1993 WL
561125, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1993) (quoting cases); Ex parte Cryer, 814 So. 2d
239, 247 (Ala. 2001) (quoting cases); Heffron v. Dist. Ct. of Okla. Cty., 77 P.3d
1069, 1079 (Okla. 2003); Arnold v. City of Chattanooga, 19 S.W.3d 779, 784 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1999); State ex rel. Montpelier U.S. Ins. Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788,
800–02 (W. Va. 2014).
354. In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 561125, at *3.
355. See, e.g., Waymo L.L.C. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 870 F.3d 1350, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2011));
F.T.C. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 778 F.3d 142, 149 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
Richey, 632 F.3d at 568; In re Prof’ls Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 432, 439 (6th Cir.
2009); United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998); Logan v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976–77 (7th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Bally’s Park
Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992); Wells Dairy, Inc.
v. Am. Indus. Refrigeration, Inc., 690 N.W.2d 38, 48 (Iowa 2004); Wynn Resorts,
Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 399 P.3d 334, 347 (Nev. 2017).
356. United States v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082
(N.D. Cal. 2002).
357. See, e.g., In re Prof’ls Direct Ins. Co., 578 F.3d at 439 (determining whether
documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation required examination of the
documents and the context in which they were prepared).
358. DOCKTERMAN, supra note 30, at 325.
359. Id.
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product contexts does not require intentional or knowing conduct by a
party.360  A party may waive the privilege or work product immunity im-
pliedly or inadvertently.  The implied or inadvertent waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege with respect to a document or communication does
not necessarily waive work product immunity with respect to the same in-
formation, however, because the two doctrines “are independent and
grounded on different policies.”361
If a party waives its attorney-client privilege or tangible work product
immunity, the question then becomes the scope of the waiver.  The con-
cern for the waiving party is whether it triggered a subject matter waiver,
i.e., whether it has waived the privilege or tangible work product protec-
tion for all communications or materials relating to the same subject mat-
ter.362  The subject matter waiver doctrine does not apply to opinion work
product.363
There is “no bright line test” for determining whether communica-
tions or materials concern the same subject matter.364  Courts tend to
“construe the scope of subject matter as narrowly as possible but so as to
effect ‘fundamental fairness’ to both the party seeking to preserve [confi-
dentiality] and the party seeking to inquire as to a matter that has been
360. See, e.g., Curto v. Med. World Commc’ns, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 373,
379–81 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (reasoning that the plaintiff could not avoid waiving her
attorney-client privilege or work product immunity by declaring that she did not
intend to waive them when she delivered protected documents to the defendants,
observing that a party may waive work product immunity when it uses information
in a manner inconsistent with such immunity, and explaining why that was the
situation in this case); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC
(RNBx), 2010 WL 3705902, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010) (explaining that al-
though MGA did not intend to waive the attorney-client privilege by producing a
document, a party’s subjective intent does not control whether a waiver occurred);
see also EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 508 (“Waiver can and does occur by operation of
the law, despite the fact that the waiver may have been unknowing, involuntary,
and unintentional.”); THOMAS E. SPAHN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 554 (3d ed. 2013) (“In the
waiver context, courts agree that a client can waive the privilege without intending
to do so.”).
361. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 1280; see also Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 326 (Ill. 1991) (stating that the attorney-client privi-
lege and work product doctrine “are separate and distinct protections and waiver
of one does not serve as waiver of the other”).
362. See, e.g., Morris v. Scenera Research, L.L.C., No. 09 CVS 19678, 2011 WL
3808544, at *11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 2011) (“A waiver of certain communica-
tions can waive the attorney-client privilege not only as to the particular communi-
cation but to other communications relating to that same subject matter.”).
363. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, Case No. 16-81371-CIV-MID-
DLEBROOKS, 2017 WL 1376383, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2017) (quoting Cox v.
Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1423 (11th Cir. 1994)); Puckett v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, Inc., 5:16-CV-05909, 2016 WL 6828609, at *3 (S.D. W. Va.
Nov. 17, 2016) (citing In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623, 625–26 (4th
Cir. 1988)).
364. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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partially disclosed.”365  Indeed, the subject matter waiver doctrine is in-
tended to prevent a party from selectively disclosing otherwise confidential
material or communications that advance its case while sequestering unfa-
vorable information.366  Thus, where the disclosure is inadvertent, waiver
should generally be limited to the documents or communications dis-
closed rather than being extended to other materials concerning the same
subject.367  Where a subject matter waiver is fairly in play, however, the
following factors may be relevant in deciding whether disclosed and undis-
closed communications relate to the same subject matter:
1) the general nature of the lawyer’s assignment; 2) the extent to
which the lawyer’s activities in fulfilling that assignment are un-
differentiated and unitary or are distinct and severable; 3) the
extent to which the disclosed and undisclosed communications
share, or do not share, a common nexus with a distinct activity;
4) the circumstances in and purposes for which disclosure origi-
nally was made; 5) the circumstances in and purposes for which
further disclosure is sought; 6) the risks to the interests protected
by the privilege if further disclosure were to occur; and 7) the
prejudice which might result if disclosure were not to occur.368
In federal courts, subject matter waiver is controlled by Federal Rule
of Evidence 502(a), which provides that a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or work product immunity reaches undisclosed communications
or information “only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and
undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject
matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.”369  As
the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 502(a) explain, the rule “is re-
served for those unusual situations in which fairness requires a further
disclosure of related, protected information, in order to prevent a selec-
tive and misleading presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the
adversary.”370  Rule 502(a)(1) clarifies that the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged communications or work product material will not produce a
subject matter waiver.371
365. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 791.
366. Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head GP, L.L.C., 981 N.E.2d 345, 357 (Ill.
2012).
367. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 791.
368. United States v. Skeddle, 989 F. Supp. 917, 919 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (quot-
ing a prior order in the case).
369. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
370. FED. R. EVID. 502 Judicial Conference Advisory Committee Explanatory
Note (Revised 11/28/2007) (citing In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Bene-
fit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312 (D.D.C. 1994)).
371. See id. (“Thus, subject matter waiver is limited to situations in which a
party intentionally puts protected information into the litigation in a selective, mis-
leading and unfair manner. It follows that an inadvertent disclosure of protected
information can never result in a subject matter waiver.”).
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Two recent federal cases, Banneker Ventures, L.L.C v. Graham372 and
Doe 1 v. Baylor University,373 illustrate the risk of waiver and the potentially
uncertain application of the attorney-client privilege and work product im-
munity in internal investigations.374
1. Banneker Ventures
Banneker Ventures arose out of Banneker Ventures, L.L.C.’s (Ban-
neker) failed attempt to develop property above a Washington, DC com-
muter rail station.375  The proposed development was known as the
Florida Avenue Project.376  Banneker won the bid to develop the property
from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), but
after a year of related negotiations, WMATA terminated its relationship
with Banneker in late March 2010.377  One month later, Banneker’s law-
yer, A. Scott Bolden, wrote to WMATA and outlined what Banneker be-
lieved to be misconduct by the organization and its board of directors.378
Pointedly, Banneker believed that WMATA board member Jim Graham
had secretly schemed to steer the Florida Avenue Project to a different
developer that supported him politically.379  Bolden’s letter asked
WMATA to restart negotiations so that Banneker could launch the Florida
Avenue Project.380  Bolden’s letter also warned WMATA that Banneker
would seek legal and equitable remedies if negotiations over the Florida
Avenue Project did not resume.381  WMATA did not reopen
negotiations.382
Over two years later, WMATA retained Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft LLP to “provide investigative and legal services regarding the actions
of WMATA’s Board in connection with the Florida Avenue Project.”383
372. 253 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2017).
373. 320 F.R.D. 430 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
374. See, e.g., Doe v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Educ., Case No. 1:16-cv-373, 2018
WL 542971, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 24, 2018) (concluding that the defendant
waived the attorney-client privilege, tangible work product immunity, and opinion
work product immunity by publicly releasing the report of an internal investiga-
tion and thereafter stating that it intended to rely on the investigation and report
to defend lawsuits against it); Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 399
P.3d 334, 346–47, 349 (Nev. 2017) (affirming the trial court’s decision that Wynn
Resorts waived its attorney-client privilege by disclosing the report of an internal
investigation conducted by the Freeh Group, but issuing a writ of prohibition di-
recting the trial court to determine the applicability of the work product doctrine).
375. Banneker Ventures, L.L.C. v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1125 (D.C. 2015).
376. Banneker Ventures, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 68.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Banneker Ventures, 798 F.3d at 1125.
380. Banneker Ventures, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 68.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 69 (citing and quoting WMATA’s memorandum in support of its
motion for a protective order) (internal quotations omitted).
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Cadwalader lawyers interviewed thirty-four witnesses, nineteen of whom
were current or former WMATA employees or board members, and pre-
pared fifty-one interview memoranda.384  The Cadwalader lawyers who
created the memoranda labeled them “attorney work product.”385
At the conclusion of the investigation, Bradley Bondi of Cadwalader
delivered the firm’s report (the Bondi Report) to WMATA.386  The
WMATA board recommended public release of the Bondi Report.387  The
Bondi Report included references to, and citations from, the Cadwalader
lawyers’ witness interview memos.388
Banneker sued WMATA, Graham, and others for cutting it out of the
Florida Avenue Project.389  In discovery, Banneker requested the fifty-one
interview memoranda.390  WMATA moved for a protective order on the
basis that the memos were protected against discovery by the work product
doctrine and attorney-client privilege.391
Beginning its analysis with the work product doctrine, the court ob-
served that to be undiscoverable materials must have been created in an-
ticipation of litigation, and that this requirement incorporates both
temporal and objective elements.392  WMATA argued that it anticipated
litigation because the Bondi Report and the underlying interviews were
sparked by Bolden’s letter threatening possible legal action.393  WMATA
also filed a declaration from former Cadwalader lawyer Emily Rockwood,
which stated that she knew Banneker might sue WMATA over the Florida
Avenue Project; that the interview memoranda were “intended to be inter-
nal work product for use by the Cadwalader legal team”; and that the cita-
tions to the memos in the Bondi Report “were ‘intended for reference by
the Cadwalader team.’”394  Banneker countered that WMATA did not rea-
sonably anticipate litigation because it waited more than two years after
receiving Bolden’s letter to hire Cadwalader and did nothing litigation-
related in the interim.395  Banneker also argued that other evidence
showed that the investigation was conducted for business reasons.396  Ac-
cording to Banneker, the true purpose of the investigation was to ascertain
whether WMATA directors were performing their duties as public servants
384. Id.
385. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 68.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. (quoting Rockwood’s declaration) (internal quotations omitted).
395. Id.
396. Id.
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or whether new rules and procedures were required, and to respond to
public demands for accountability.397
While acknowledging that “there is no standard or rule regarding
how close in time potential litigation must be,” the Banneker Ventures court
concluded that the interviews were not timed to anticipated litigation.398
Although Bolden’s letter prompted WMATA to anticipate litigation, the
court was bothered by the gap between WMATA’s receipt of the letter and
its retention of Cadwalader, as well as by the lack of any action indicating
anticipated litigation during those two years.399  Absent evidence of any
intervening action by WMATA regarding Bolden’s letter, Cadwalader’s in-
vestigation could not be tied to anticipated litigation.400  “The fact that
litigation resulted shortly after the public disclosure of the Bondi Report
[did] not show that WMATA retained Cadwalader in reasonable anticipa-
tion of that litigation.”401  The court thus found that the temporal ele-
ment of work product protection was missing.402
The court further found that WMATA failed the work product doc-
trine’s motivational test because it could not show that the Cadwalader
lawyers created the interview memos in preparation for litigation.403
“Documents that would have been created in the ordinary course of busi-
ness irrespective of litigation” are not work product,404 nor are documents
that would have been created in substantially similar form regardless of
litigation.405  Here, it was apparent that “absent any anticipated litigation,
WMATA would have conducted the same investigation to evaluate its busi-
ness practices and revise the Standards of Conduct for the Board of
Directors.”406
Because the interview memoranda were not protected as work prod-
uct, the court ordered WMATA to produce the memos describing inter-
views with non-WMATA personnel.407  The court then turned to the
interview memoranda for WMATA personnel, which were potentially pro-
tected by WMATA’s attorney-client privilege.408
397. See id. (reciting Banneker’s argument).
398. Id. at 72.
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. (quoting In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C. 2010)).
404. Id. (quoting Duran v. Andrew, No. 09-730, 2010 WL 1418344, at *4–5
(D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2010)).
405. Id. (quoting FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., 778 F.3d 142, 149
(D.C. Cir. 2015)).
406. Id. at 72–73.
407. Id. at 73.
408. See id. (noting that WMATA could not invoke the attorney-client privi-
lege with respect to the memos regarding interviews of non-WMATA personnel).
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Banneker argued that WMATA waived the privilege by including parts
of the interview memos in the Bondi Report, which it released to the pub-
lic.409  The court accepted Banneker’s argument, first explaining:
[T]he Bondi Report was intended to be an internal document
. . . and not slated for public disclosure.  Upon receipt of the
Bondi Report, the WMATA Board decided to release it to the
public. . . .  By disclosing the Bondi Report, WMATA chose to
disclose the legal and factual conclusions . . . contained in the
report and, therefore, waived any claim of attorney-client privi-
lege that existed with respect to the Bondi Report itself.410
The court next evaluated whether WMATA’s public disclosure of the
Bondi Report operated as a subject matter waiver of the privilege vis-a`-vis
the underlying interview memoranda.411  In deciding this issue, the court
looked to Federal Rule of Evidence 502(a),412 which provides that a dis-
closure that waives the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine
reaches undisclosed communications or information “only if: (1) the
waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications
or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in
fairness to be considered together.”413  The court concluded that the Rule
502(a) test was met:
The . . . waiver of privilege as to the Bondi Report was intentional
. . . and the disclosed and undisclosed communications and in-
formation concern the same subject matter.  The Bondi Report
disclosed counsel’s legal and factual conclusions about the events
during negotiations with Banneker for the Florida Avenue Pro-
ject and the WMATA Board of Directors’ Standards of Con-
duct—the exact subject of the . . . interview memoranda.  In fact,
the Bondi Report cites extensively to the interview memo-
randa. . . .  Additionally, WMATA has not argued that the inter-
view memoranda contain information outside the scope of the
investigation or [the] Bondi Report.
Finally, . . . fairness dictates the Bondi Report and interview
memoranda should be considered together. . . .  WMATA has
permitted direct citation and reference to confidential communi-
cations to be disclosed publically in the Bondi Report. WMATA
has also used the Bondi Report to its advantage in this litigation.
Fairness dictates that if WMATA is able to use the Bondi Report
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 73–74.
412. Id. at 74 (quoting U.S. Airline Pilots v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 274
F.R.D. 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 502)).
413. FED. R. EVID. 502(a).
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and facts disclosed in that report to support its claims and de-
fenses, then Banneker is entitled to the remaining facts and in-
formation contained in the interview memoranda that were not
included in the Bondi Report.  The intent of subject matter
waiver is to prevent a party from selectively disclosing informa-
tion and documents that would otherwise be privileged to gain a
tactical advantage.  WMATA cannot both benefit from the disclo-
sure of the Bondi Report and prevent further disclosure of the
remaining information in the interview memoranda.414
The court did hold that WMATA could redact information from the
interview memoranda before production that was unrelated to the sub-
jects covered by the Bondi Report, and announced that it would issue a
protective order along those lines.415  In the end, the Banneker Ventures
court granted in part and denied in part WMATA’s motion for a protective
order.416  Banneker, however, was the clear winner.
2. Doe 1 v. Baylor University
Doe 1 v. Baylor University417 arose out of a sexual assault scandal that
decimated the Baylor football program and ultimately engulfed the uni-
versity.418  Multiple young women alleged that they were raped by Baylor
football players beginning in 2011 or so.419
In September 2015, in the midst of the scandal, Baylor’s Board of
Regents hired Pepper Hamilton, LLP to “conduct an independent and
external review of Baylor University’s institutional responses to Title IX
and related compliance issues through the lens of specific cases.”420  In
February 2016, Baylor and Pepper Hamilton amended their engagement
agreement to include the following language:
Specifically, Pepper [Hamilton] has been engaged . . . to provide
legal advice and guidance to the University in connection with
the independent and external review [previously identified] and
other matters related to the institutional response to ongoing
414. Banneker Ventures, 253 F. Supp. 3d at 74.
415. Id. at 74–75.
416. Id. at 75.
417. 320 F.R.D. 430 (W.D. Tex. 2017).
418. See generally Marc Tracy & Dan Barry, The Rise, Then Shame, of Baylor Na-
tion, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/sports/
baylor-football-sexual-assault.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6AB5-9W66] (report-
ing that since a young woman reported being raped by a Baylor football player in
2012, allegations of sexual assault by Baylor football players multiplied, “causing
incalculable damage to the university’s reputation and leading to resignations and
firings, including those of the president, the football coach and the athletic
director”).
419. Id.
420. Doe I, 320 F.R.D. at 434 (quoting the 2015 engagement agreement) (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
56
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss4/2
2018] MINEFIELD OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 673
matters under Title IX . . . and related authority.  It is the shared
understanding of Baylor University and Pepper [Hamilton] that
all material prepared and communications made by Baylor Uni-
versity, Pepper [Hamilton], and their representatives in the
course of the review are in anticipation of litigation and are privi-
leged work product.421
The remainder of the engagement letter remained unchanged.422
A few months later, Baylor released two documents sketching the re-
sults of Pepper Hamilton’s investigation: a summary of the investigation
and its conclusions headed “Findings of Fact,” and a list of recommenda-
tions titled “Report of External and Independent Review, Recommenda-
tions” (Recommendations).423  Ten women—Jane Does 1–10—filed Doe I
and sought to discover the materials “provided to and produced by Pepper
Hamilton in connection with the investigation.”424  Baylor resisted on at-
torney-client privilege and work product grounds.425  In response, the Doe
I plaintiffs argued that the materials were discoverable because Pepper
Hamilton had not provided legal services to Baylor in anticipation of litiga-
tion, but had instead conducted the investigation to mitigate “a public
relations scandal.”426  They further argued that Baylor’s numerous public
disclosures concerning the investigation had waived any otherwise applica-
ble confidentiality protections.427
The Doe I court easily concluded that the attorney-client privilege ap-
plied to the materials sought.428  The 2015 engagement letter recited that
Baylor hired Pepper Hamilton “to conduct an independent and external
review of Baylor University’s institutional responses to Title IX and related
compliance issues through the lens of specific cases.”429  Although the let-
ter did not refer to “‘legal advice,’ ‘legal assistance,’ or the like, there is no
magic phrase that must be included in an engagement letter to invoke the
attorney-client privilege.”430  The 2015 engagement letter clearly reflected
that Baylor hired Pepper Hamilton to “review its compliance with federal
law—in other words, to obtain legal advice.”431  The 2016 amendment to
the engagement letter was immaterial because it merely clarified that Bay-
lor was seeking legal advice when it first retained Pepper Hamilton—it did
421. Id. (quoting the 2016 engagement agreement).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id. (footnote omitted).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 437.
429. Id. at 436 (quoting the 2015 engagement letter) (internal quotations
omitted).
430. Id.
431. Id.
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not alter the scope of the firm’s engagement or change its mandate.432
Baylor also submitted affidavits establishing that it engaged Pepper Hamil-
ton to provide legal advice and services, and that the firm did so.433
The plaintiffs argued that the privilege did not apply because Pepper
Hamilton “conducted an ‘independent investigation’ for Baylor,” rather
than providing legal representation.434  This argument was doomed from
the start considering that perhaps the leading Supreme Court attorney-
client privilege case, Upjohn Co. v. United States,435 recognized the privilege
in connection with an internal investigation.436  Try as they might, the
plaintiffs could not distinguish this case from Upjohn or other internal in-
vestigation cases where courts upheld the privilege.437
Fighting on, the plaintiffs argued that even if the communications at
issue were privileged, Baylor had waived the privilege through three disclo-
sures.438  First, Baylor publicly released the Findings of Fact and Recom-
mendations in May 2016.439  Second, in defending a lawsuit by a former
athletic department employee, Baylor filed a court document in which it
quoted text messages and paraphrased conversations by Baylor staff dis-
cussing alleged rapes by football players that were reported to athletic de-
partment personnel.440  The filing stated that “all facts and evidence
discussed were revealed by Pepper Hamilton’s investigation.”441  Third,
Pepper Hamilton briefed former Baylor regents about confidential aspects
of the investigation.442
The court agreed with the plaintiffs that Baylor had waived the attor-
ney-client privilege.443  Consequently, the court had to analyze the scope
of the waiver.444  Because Baylor had repeatedly represented that the
Findings of Fact and Recommendations “summarize[d] and re-
present[ed] the full course of Pepper Hamilton’s investigation,” and given
“the level of detail publicly released about the investigation as a whole,”
the court concluded that Baylor had waived the privilege with respect to
all communications with, and information and materials provided to, Pep-
per Hamilton.445
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
436. Doe I, 320 F.R.D. at 436.
437. Id. at 436–37.
438. Id. at 437.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. (internal citations omitted).
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 440.
445. Id.
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Having resolved the privilege issue, the court turned to Baylor’s work
product claim.446  The plaintiffs contended that the work product doc-
trine did not apply because Baylor did not retain Pepper Hamilton in an-
ticipation of litigation, and even if it did, Baylor had waived any
protection.447  Baylor, however, demonstrated that its decision to hire
Pepper Hamilton was “primarily motivated by its anticipation of litiga-
tion.”448  For example, by August 2015, a Baylor football player had been
convicted of raping a former Baylor soccer player, and the local newspa-
per had reported that the young woman had hired a lawyer.449  Other
media reports suggested imminent litigation and possible government ac-
tion against the university.450
The plaintiffs contended that because Baylor’s public statements con-
cerning the Pepper Hamilton investigation never mentioned potential liti-
gation, Baylor must not have retained the firm primarily for that
reason.451  This argument did not impress the Doe I court.  As the court
explained, “no magic words” are required to invoke the work product doc-
trine.452  Furthermore, an organization might not want to signal that it
had hired a law firm in anticipation of litigation lest it actually encourage
that litigation.453
Continuing, the court observed that waiver is narrower in the work
product context than it is in the attorney-client privilege context.454  The
court reasoned that subject matter waiver of work product immunity is
generally confined to cases where the party claiming immunity “directly
placed at issue” the “quality and substance” of a lawyer’s work product.455
That was not the situation here, where Baylor had not relied on Pepper
Hamilton’s work product in formulating its defense.456  For example, Bay-
lor never mentioned Pepper Hamilton’s investigation in its answer in the
case.457
Finally, because the plaintiffs were seeking Pepper Hamilton’s tangi-
ble work product, they could obtain it even in the absence of waiver if they
could show substantial need for the materials to prepare their case and
their inability, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial
446. Id.
447. Id. at 440–41.
448. Id. at 441.
449. Id.
450. See id. (describing the influence of media reports on Baylor’s general
counsel and one of its regents).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 442.
455. Id. (citing Feld v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 991 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255
(D.D.C. 2013)).
456. Id.
457. Id.
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equivalent by other means.458  The plaintiffs, however, had made no such
showing.459  The court left open the possibility that they might be able to
clear this substantial hurdle in the future.460
Although Baylor largely prevailed on the work product issue, it did
not achieve a clean sweep.461  The court rejected Baylor’s attempt to with-
hold the names of the people that Pepper Hamilton interviewed and the
data and documents it produced to Pepper Hamilton.462  Baylor had not
demonstrated that this information qualified as work product.463  In any
event, Baylor had made a limited waiver of work product immunity when it
released the interviewees’ names and revealed specific sources of data that
Pepper Hamilton reviewed.464  “Just as Baylor could not release half of a
memo written by Pepper Hamilton and withhold the other half as pro-
tected, Baylor [could not] release the names of certain individuals who
were interviewed and certain data sources and withhold the rest as pro-
tected attorney work product.”465
In summary, the Doe I court held that Baylor did not have to produce
“interview memoranda, notes, emails, presentations, and other ‘docu-
ments and tangible things that [were] prepared’ as part of Pepper Hamil-
ton’s investigation” which had not been released.466  The plaintiffs could
not ask questions of witnesses that sought the mental impressions of Bay-
lor’s lawyers.467  In addition, Baylor did not have to produce documents
Pepper Hamilton selected for use in interviews, recordings of interviews
conducted by Pepper Hamilton, or Pepper Hamilton’s interview notes.468
D. Conclusion
Internal investigations present frequent opportunities for attorney-cli-
ent privilege and work product controversies.  Lawyers should consider
several measures to increase the likelihood that these important confiden-
tiality protections are preserved.
First, assuming it to be true, a lawyer should state in her engagement
letter that the investigation is intended to provide the client with legal
advice or to assist her in delivering legal services to the client.469  In other
458. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)).
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. See id. at 443 (stating that although “work-product protection is quite
broad, it is not as broad as Baylor asserts in its briefing”).
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. See, e.g., Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 620 (7th
Cir. 2010) (focusing on the engagement letter between the defendant school
board and the law firm hired to investigate a teacher’s alleged sexual abuse of
60
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words, the lawyer is functioning in a legal capacity and not simply as an
investigator.  Similarly, and again where applicable, the engagement letter
should state that the investigation is being conducted in anticipation of
litigation.  The fact that another law firm will be retained to represent the
organization in any actual or threatened litigation does not prevent work
product immunity from attaching to the investigating lawyer’s efforts.470
Second, the lawyer should explain to the client the essential contours
of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and how these
protections may be waived, so the client can reasonably act to preserve
confidentiality.471  If the report of the investigation will be publicly re-
leased or will be shared with government agencies, the lawyer should also
discuss with the client the likely effect of those decisions on the privilege
and work product immunity.
Third, the investigating lawyers should conduct the investigation in a
fashion consistent with the application and preservation of the attorney-
client privilege and work product immunity.472  Such measures or proce-
dures include the administration of Upjohn or corporate Miranda warnings
to employees and witnesses, maintaining confidentiality throughout the
course of the investigation and the delivery of any report, and appropri-
ately labeling documents created in the investigation as privileged or work
product.473  Lawyers should also differentiate between legal advice and
business advice to the client and when reasonably practicable, may wish to
provide non-legal advice in separate communications.474
Fourth, to best ensure application of the attorney-client privilege, any
report of the investigation should be written in a way that reflects the law-
yer’s legal advice.475  To be sure, it will also be necessary for the lawyer to
recite facts and include non-privileged information in the report as a foun-
dation for her legal advice or conclusions, but the inclusion of such mate-
students, which spelled out that the board retained the law firm to provide legal
services in responding to the abuse allegations, and thus supported recognition of
the attorney-client privilege).
470. See id. at 622 (stating that the fact that the investigating law firm was not
the defendant’s litigation counsel “was not dispositive” when evaluating possible
work product immunity, and concluding that the investigating lawyers’ witness in-
terview notes and memoranda qualified for work product protection).
471. See S.E.C. v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. 1997) (explaining that “the
holder must zealously protect the privileged materials, taking all reasonable steps
to prevent their disclosure”).
472. See, e.g., Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 620 (discussing the lawyers’ conduct
during the investigation).
473. Id.
474. See, e.g., Spectrum Sys. Int’l Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 581 N.E.2d 1055, 1061
(N.Y. 1991) (observing that the law firm’s report contained no business or other
non-legal advice and was therefore privileged).
475. See, e.g., id. at 1060 (“The report . . . sets forth the firm’s assessment
regarding a possible legal claim, its approximate size and weaknesses.  As a confi-
dential report from lawyer to client transmitted in the course of professional em-
ployment and conveying the lawyer’s assessment of the client’s legal position, the
document has the earmarks of a privileged communication.”).
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rial does not alone vitiate the attorney-client privilege.476  With an eye
toward enforcing work product protection, the report should be written in
a fashion that delivers as much of the content as possible in the form of
the lawyer’s evaluation, observations, and opinions, and minimizes verba-
tim statements by witnesses.477  The obvious disadvantage to this approach
is that disclosure of the report to third parties—whether inadvertent or
intentional—may be especially damaging to the client.478
Finally, when preparing an investigative report that the client will
likely release to the public, the lawyer should carefully consider whether
statements in the report might waive the attorney-client privilege or jeop-
ardize work product immunity.  If so, those portions of the report may
need to be edited to avoid waiver.  Protecting against possible subject mat-
ter waiver is a particular goal here.  The lawyer should also advise or re-
mind the client of the possible effect of the report’s release on the
privilege and work product immunity.479
VI. THE RISK OF LIABILITY FOR DEFAMATION
Internal investigations often expose misconduct by employees and
other close organizational constituents, and more than occasionally un-
cover evidence of possible crimes by the same categories of people.  When
such findings are incorporated in a written report of the investigation or
are otherwise revealed at the conclusion of the investigation, the accused
individuals may be seriously harmed.  Even if there are no criminal conse-
quences, they may lose their jobs and have their reputations permanently
stained.480  Those with professional licenses may lose their careers.  Ac-
cordingly, internal investigations almost invite defamation claims against
the inquiring lawyers.481
476. Id. at 1060–61.
477. Edwin G. Schallert & Natalie R. Williams, Report of the Investigation, in
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS, 301, 310 (Barry F. McNeil & Brad D. Brian
eds., 3d ed. 2007).
478. See id. at 310 (warning that “the greater the reliance on [the investigating
lawyer’s] subjective opinion and mental impressions, the greater the harm should
the report be discovered”).
479. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2), (b) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2017).
480. See, e.g., Melissa Daniels, Uber Fires 20 Amid Perkins Coie Workplace Culture
Probe, LAW360 (June 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/931941/print?sec
tion=automotive [Permalink unavailable] (reporting that Uber Technologies, Inc.
fired 20 employees following an investigation by an outside law firm into allega-
tions of sexual harassment and other workplace misconduct). See generally RODNEY
A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 8:53, at 8-33 to -34 (1999 & Supp. 2006) (“Very
few defamatory statements carry more potential for devastating harm . . . than false
and defamatory evaluations of an employee’s work performance.  Careers may
turn on such evaluations. . . .”).
481. See, e.g., Kat Greene, Sidley-Authored Report on 9/11-Era Torture Defamatory:
Suit, LAW360 (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/894317/print?sec
tion=legalethics [Permalink unavailable] (reporting on a lawsuit by a group of psy-
chologists against a respected former federal prosecutor arising out of the report
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A. Defamation Essentials
Defamation may take the form of libel or slander.482  “Defamation by
writing and by contemporary means analogous to writing is libel.  Defama-
tion communicated orally is slander.”483  Under section 558 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, a plaintiff who alleges defamation must prove the
following elements:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the pub-
lisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.484
If even one of these elements is missing, the plaintiff’s cause of action will
fail.485
A statement must be both false and defamatory to be actionable.486  A
statement is false for defamation purposes if it “is not substantially cor-
rect.”487  Or, phrased slightly differently, a substantially true statement is
not false, and consequently is not actionable.488  In other words, a defen-
dant need not establish “the literal truth of the precise statement made” to
avoid liability.489  “Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial pro-
vided that the [allegedly] defamatory charge is true in substance.”490
A statement is defamatory if it tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation
“either by lowering the esteem in which he is held or by discouraging
others from associating with him.”491  The threshold question of whether
of an investigation for the American Psychological Association concerning the psy-
chologists’ roles in crafting or defending harsh interrogation techniques; the inves-
tigation followed allegations by a journalist that the APA had colluded with the
CIA and the military to support torture).
482. Swanson Towing & Recovery, L.L.C. v. Wrecker 1, Inc., 802 S.E.2d 300,
305 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017); W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1153 (N.J. 2012).
483. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 519, at 173 (2d ed. 2011).
484. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
485. Dietz v. Dietz, 165 So. 3d 342, 360 (La. Ct. App. 2015).
486. Miller v. Cent. Ind. Cmty. Found., Inc., 11 N.E.3d 944, 956 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014); Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 594 (Va. 2015).
487. Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1212 (Md. 1992).
488. See Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 183–84 (D.C. 2013) (discount-
ing “minor inaccuracies” in factual statements “ ‘so long as the substance, the gist,
the sting, of the libelous charge be justified’” (quoting Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co.,
22 F.3d 310, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); Thomas v. Sumner, 341 P.3d 390, 402 (Wyo.
2015) (citing Tschirgi v. Lander Wyo. State Journal, 706 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wyo.
1985)).
489. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f (1977).
490. Id.
491. Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Atl. Ne. Rails & Ports, Inc., 804 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir.
2015) (applying Maine law); see also Tuite v. Corbitt, 866 N.E.2d 114, 121 (Ill.
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a communication is capable of defamatory meaning is a question of law
for the court.492
True statements are not actionable as defamation no matter how
badly they supposedly blemished the plaintiff’s reputation.493  But while
courts often say that truth is an absolute or complete defense to alleged
defamation,494 it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the offending state-
ment’s falsity.495  If the statement is true, the plaintiff cannot prove her
prima facie case and she will lose.496  Thus, truth is not actually a defense to
alleged defamation,497 although for obvious reasons defendants always
raise truth in response to a defamation claim.
To be actionable, the allegedly defamatory statement also must be
one of fact rather than opinion.498  Statements of opinion generally are
protected under the First Amendment.499  Whether a statement is one of
2006) (“A statement is defamatory if it tends to harm a person’s reputation to the
extent that it lowers that person in the eyes of the community or deters others
from associating with that person.”).
492. Dietz v. Dietz, 165 So. 3d 342, 360 (La. Ct. App. 2015); Sarkar v. Doe, 897
N.W.2d 207, 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Ghanam v. Does, 845 N.W.2d
128, 143 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014)); Chapman v. Maxwell, 322 P.3d 1029, 1032 (Mont.
2014); Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 595 (Va. 2015).
493. Others First, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 829
F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Missouri law); Pan Am Sys., Inc., 804 F.3d at
64.
494. See, e.g., Cottrell v. Smith, 788 S.E.2d 772, 781 (Ga. 2016) (“Truth is a
complete defense to alleged libel or slander.”); Greenberg v. Spitzer, 62 N.Y.S.3d
372, 386 (App. Div. 2017) (asserting that “truth is an absolute defense to an action
based on defamation”).
495. See, e.g., Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 74 (4th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Belcher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 568 S.E.2d 19, 22 (W. Va.
2002)); Fureigh v. Horn, 434 S.W.3d 390, 393–94 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014) (listing a
statement’s falsity as an element the plaintiff must prove); Hadley v. Doe, 34
N.E.3d 549, 557 (Ill. 2015) (explaining that to “state a cause of action for defama-
tion, a plaintiff must present facts showing the defendant made a false statement
about the plaintiff”); Lindenmuth v. McCreer, 165 A.3d 544, 555 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2017) (observing the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the defendant’s state-
ments were false, “an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case of defamation”);
Armistead v. Minor, 815 So. 2d 1189, 1193 (Miss. 2002) (listing falsity as an ele-
ment the plaintiff must prove); Terry v. Journal Broad. Corp., 840 N.W.2d 255,
264–65 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Freer v. M & I Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 688
N.W.2d 756, 760 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)).
496. See Emeson v. Dep’t of Corrs., 376 P.3d 430, 443 (Wash. Ct. App. 2016)
(stating that without a false and defamatory statement, libel and slander claims will
fail).
497. Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1212 (Md. 1992); DOBBS ET AL., supra
note 483, § 537, at 237. But see Johnson v. Phillips, 526 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tex. App.
2017) (stating that regardless of whether “a particular plaintiff is required to prove
the falsity of the challenged statement, a defendant may assert truth as an affirma-
tive defense to a libel action”).
498. Scholz v. Delp, 41 N.E.3d 38, 45 (Mass. 2015).
499. Others First, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater St. Louis, Inc., 829
F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 2016) (applying Missouri law); Agar v. Judy, 151 A.3d 456,
481 (Del. Ch. 2017); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1241 (D.C.
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fact or opinion is a question of law.500  In distinguishing between state-
ments of fact and opinion, courts examine the totality of the circum-
stances.501  With slight variation between jurisdictions, relevant factors in
this examination “include (1) whether the general tenor of the entire
work negates the impression that the defendant asserted an objective fact,
(2) whether the defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language, and (3)
whether the statement is susceptible of being proved true or false.”502  Of
course, a statement of pure opinion cannot be proven true or false.503
A statement of opinion may be actionable, however, if it implies the
existence of facts that are false and defamatory.504  In that case, “the prov-
ably false implications are actionable in the same way as other statements
or implications of fact.”505  But liability for defamation will not lie if the
defendant discloses the true facts undergirding the opinion.506  As the
Ninth Circuit explained in Partington v. Bugliosi,507 “when an author out-
lines the facts available to him, thus making it clear that the challenged
statements represent his own interpretation of those facts and leaving the
reader free to draw his own conclusions, those statements are generally
protected by the First Amendment.”508  Thus, for a lawyer potentially ex-
posed to liability for an opinion that implies a factual basis, the lesson is
2016); Elliott v. Murdock, 385 P.3d 459, 465 (Idaho 2016); McKee v. Laurion, 825
N.W.2d 725, 733 (Minn. 2013).
500. Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying Florida
law); Doe 2 v. Super. Ct., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 68–69 (Ct. App. 2016); Smith v.
Humane Soc’y of U.S., 519 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Mo. 2017) (quoting Nazeri v. Mo.
Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. 1993)); Mehta v. Ohio Univ., 958 N.E.2d
598, 608 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011); Johnson, 526 S.W.3d at 535.
501. Dickinson v. Cosby, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 430, 457 (Ct. App. 2017);
Steinhausen v. Home Servs. of Neb., Inc., 857 N.W.2d 816, 828 (Neb. 2015); Gilson
v. Am. Inst. of Alt. Med., 62 N.E.3d 754, 774 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
502. Steinhausen, 857 N.W.2d at 828; see also Obsidian Fin. Grp., L.L.C. v. Cox,
740 F.3d 1284, 1293 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting an earlier case, Parkington v. Bugliosi,
56 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1995), in phrasing the test in nearly identical terms);
Greenberg v. Horizon Ark. Publ’ns, Inc., 522 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017)
(offering nearly identical language); Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1125 (Or.
2016) (using very similar language in phrasing the test).
503. See, e.g., McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 733 (describing someone as “a real tool”
reflects pure opinion “because the term ‘real tool’ cannot be reasonably inter-
preted as stating a fact and it cannot be proven true or false”) (emphasis added).
504. Piccone v. Bartels, 785 F.3d 766, 771 (1st Cir. 2015); Alaskaland.com,
L.L.C. v. Cross, 357 P.3d 805, 819 (Alaska 2015) (quoting State v. Carpenter, 171
P.3d 41, 51 (Alaska 2007)); Dickinson, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 457; Jacobs v. The Oath
for La., Inc., 221 So. 3d 241, 246 (La. Ct. App. 2017).
505. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 483, § 569, at 318.
506. Piccone, 785 F.3d at 771; Sarkar v. Doe, 897 N.W.2d 207, 226–27 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2016); Young v. Wilham, 406 P.3d 988, 997 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017).
507. 56 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1995).
508. Id. at 1156–57.
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obvious: reveal the non-defamatory facts on which the opinion is
predicated.509
A defendant also may avoid liability if the defamatory statement was
privileged.  A privilege is either qualified or absolute.510  A qualified privi-
lege may be lost through unreasonable actions that abuse the privilege.511
To use a common example, a person whose statements are animated by
actual malice abuses a qualified privilege and consequently loses its protec-
tion.512  A qualified privilege may further be lost through abuse if the de-
fendant knew the defamatory information was false, had no reason to
believe it was true, or excessively published it.513
In contrast, an absolute privilege is a complete bar to liability regard-
less of the defendant’s motive or the reasonableness of her conduct.514
The best example of an absolute privilege enjoyed by lawyers is the litiga-
tion privilege set forth in section 586 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during
the course and as part of, a judicial proceeding in which he par-
ticipates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.515
It is easy to imagine an organization conducting an internal investiga-
tion “preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding,”516 such that defama-
tory statements by the investigating lawyers relating to the proceeding
would be absolutely privileged.  In Shell Oil Co. v. Writt,517 the Texas Su-
509. See Piccone, 785 F.3d at 771 (“Thus, the speaker can immunize his state-
ment from defamation liability by fully disclosing the non-defamatory facts on
which his opinion is based.”).
510. Lindenmuth v. McCreer, 165 A.3d 544, 553 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
511. Toler v. Su¨d-Chemie, Inc., 458 S.W.3d 276, 283 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
512. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of Columbus, 883 N.E.2d 1060, 1064–65 (Ohio
2008) (involving an internal investigation).
513. See Patrick v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 489 S.W.3d 683, 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016)
(stating that qualified privilege may be lost if it is abused by excessive publication,
if the offending statement is made with actual malice, or if the statement is made
with “a lack of grounds for belief in [its] truth”); McCollough v. Noblesville Schs.,
63 N.E.3d 334, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that the common interest privi-
lege, which is a qualified privilege, can be lost through abuse, i.e., the defendant
was primarily motivated by ill will, the statement was published excessively, or the
statement was made without belief or grounds for belief in its truth); Downey v.
Chutehall Constr. Co., Ltd., 19 N.E.3d 470, 477 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014) (explaining
that a qualified privilege may be abused and therefore lost if the defendant acted
out of malice, knew the information was false, had no reason to believe the infor-
mation was true, acted in reckless disregard of the truth, or published the informa-
tion excessively, unnecessarily, or unreasonably).
514. Hosmane v. Seley-Radtke, 132 A.3d 348, 356 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).
515. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977).
516. Id.
517. 464 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2015).
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preme Court concluded that the litigation privilege attached to defama-
tory statements in the report of an internal investigation by outside lawyers
and investigators.518  Shell initiated the investigation after the Department
of Justice notified the company that it was the target of a Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act investigation.519  Because Shell “acted with serious contem-
plation of the possibility that it might be prosecuted,”520 the investigation
was preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, and the statements in
the report were absolutely privileged.521  Although the plaintiff in Writt
sued Shell rather than the investigating lawyers, the result would have
been the same had the lawyers been the targets of the litigation.522
B. A Representative Case
Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.523 nicely illustrates lawyers’ potential
exposure to defamation liability arising out of internal investigations.
Pearce arose out of a 1985 investigation of E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.’s (Hut-
ton) allegedly illegal corporate practices by the legendary Griffin Bell and
his law firm, King & Spalding.524  The Hutton Group, which owned Hut-
ton, hired Bell in response to a Department of Justice inquiry, other gov-
ernment probes, and the associated public relations circus.525  Bell’s
investigation yielded the “Hutton Report,” which named numerous Hut-
ton employees who were allegedly responsible for the fraudulent cash
management practices in question and recommended sanctions against
them.526  Bell made the Hutton Report available to the public at a Wash-
ington, DC press conference.527
Among the employees Bell identified as a wrongdoer was John
Pearce, who managed Hutton’s St. Louis office.528  After the Hutton Re-
port came out, Hutton removed Pearce from his position and transferred
him to Florida; he later left the company.529  In addition, state securities
regulators took punitive actions against him.530
518. Id. at 656–59.
519. Id. at 651, 655–56, 659.
520. Id. at 659.
521. Id. at 656–59.
522. See DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGA-
TION 130–34 (2d ed. 2016) (discussing the application of the litigation privilege to
allegedly defamatory statements by lawyers preliminary to proposed judicial
proceedings).
523. 664 F. Supp. 1490 (D.D.C. 1987).
524. Id. at 1493–94.
525. Id. at 1493.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 1494.
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Pearce sued the Hutton Group and Bell on several theories, including
libel.531  He alleged in relevant part that the Hutton Report falsely as-
serted that he should have known his conduct was unlawful, and violated
Hutton guidelines and policies.532
Bell moved for summary judgment on Pearce’s libel count on the the-
ory that the offending statements in the Hutton Report were either opin-
ions or privileged.533  The district court disagreed.534
In evaluating whether the offending statements were opinions, the
Pearce court applied the four-factor totality of the circumstances test an-
nounced by the D.C. Circuit in Ollman v. Evans.535  This first required the
Pearce court to analyze “the common usage or meaning of the specific lan-
guage” at issue.536  Here, Bell had written that Pearce’s “actions were such
that ‘no reasonable person could have believed that this conduct was
proper’ . . . and were ‘so aggressive and egregious as to warrant sanc-
tions.’”537  He had also reported that Pearce “was ‘actually engaged in
wrongdoing’ . . . and was a ‘moving force in improprieties.’”538  These
statements were not opinions.539  An average reader would understand
them to mean that Pearce knew his conduct was wrong as a matter of
fact.540  Indeed, Bell’s statements were tantamount to criminal
accusations.541
The second Ollman factor for the court to consider was whether the
statements could be verified.542  After observing that “verifiability is not a
simple, black or white determination,” and that the “degree to which a
statement is verifiable ranges over a spectrum rather than fitting into neat
categories,” the court reasoned that the statements could be objectively
proven or disproven.543  Although determining whether Pearce knew his
conduct was wrongful would require the jury to assess his intent, jurors
routinely make such determinations in criminal cases.544  In sum, Bell’s
statements were “verifiable under an objective, ‘reasonable person’
standard.”545
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 1500–09, 1519.
535. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. 1984).
536. Pearce, 664 F. Supp. at 1501.
537. Id. (quoting Pearce’s complaint) (citation to the record omitted).
538. Id. (quoting Pearce’s complaint) (citation to the record omitted).
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 981 (D.C. 1984)).
543. Id. at 1501–02.
544. Id. at 1502.
545. Id.
68
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss4/2
2018] MINEFIELD OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 685
Third, the Pearce court had to examine the context in which the state-
ments were made.546  This factor weighed heavily in Pearce’s favor:
[T]he Hutton Report as a whole undercuts [Bell’s] position that
his statements were opinion.  The average reader . . . would natu-
rally assume that he or she was being presented with a compila-
tion of facts. Another consideration in this respect is the
inclusion of cautionary language in the text where the chal-
lenged statements are found . . . .  A reader encountering such
language tends to discount what follows . . . .
Arguably, the inclusion of Bell’s statements in the “Conclusions
and Remedies” section of the Hutton Report, and the use of the
words “We conclude” and “We think” in connection with those
statements, amounts to cautionary language.  In the context of
this . . . report, however, the language is more akin to a summary
of facts than a subjective analysis of them.  Furthermore, because
the challenged statements set forth [Pearce’s] culpability, they
imply the existence of damaging, undisclosed facts beyond the
mere descriptions of the [wrongful] activities given in the [re-
port’s] more detailed sections . . . .  Therefore, the average
reader would not have been put on notice that Bell’s statements
were opinions.
Even if [Bell] had put readers on notice with cautionary lan-
guage, . . . Bell’s statements are unequivocal and amount to crim-
inal accusations.  When a statement is as factually laden as the
accusation of a crime, cautionary language is essentially unavaila-
ble to dilute the factual implications . . . .  Thus, the immediate
context of the allegedly defamatory statements indicates that they
are factual assertions and not expressions of opinion.547
Fourth, the court considered the broader social context in which the
defamatory material appeared.548  In this case, of course, the challenged
statements appeared in a former U.S. Attorney General and federal
judge’s report of his investigation into Hutton’s illegal practices.549  So
framed, a reasonable person would clearly view Bell’s statements as expres-
sing facts.550
“Given the clear and verifiable meaning of Bell’s statements” and “the
serious and professional context in which they were made,” the court con-
cluded that Bell’s opinion defense was unavailing.551  The court then con-
546. Id. (citing Ollman, 750 F.2d at 982).
547. Id. (citations omitted).
548. Id. (citing Ollman, 750 F.2d at 983).
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 1503.
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sidered the qualified privileges that Bell had asserted as affirmative
defenses.552
Bell first invoked the fair comment privilege, which immunizes opin-
ions about matters of public concern.553  The court considered that privi-
lege obsolete, however, in light of the First Amendment protections
generally afforded statements of opinion.554  Furthermore, even if that
privilege was viable, it would not apply in this case because Bell’s state-
ments were factual.555
Bell also argued that his statements were privileged because they fur-
thered a public interest.556  In this case, the public interest was the 2,000
felony counts of mail and wire fraud to which Hutton pled guilty as a re-
sult of its illegal cash management scheme.557  Although it recognized
that Bell’s statements concerned a matter of public interest,558 the court
rejected his public interest or common interest privilege defense.559  In
reaching this conclusion, the Pearce court observed that in those cases in
which courts had recognized a qualified privilege, the publication of the
defamatory information was somehow limited.560  Not so here:
The publication was made widespread without any inquiry or
urging on the part of the press.  It was not a report of ongoing or
previously undisclosed misconduct or criminal wrongdoing.  It
was not made by a public official attempting to notify the public
of something they deserved to know about.  The disclosures were
not even limited to those matters of greatest public interest—the
actions affecting the banking and securities industries.  Instead,
the report and press conference were in no way circumscribed.
They were highly detailed and included discussions of such rela-
tively private matters as recommending what sanctions Hutton
should dole out to its employees.561
After considering some additional issues not relevant here, the court
denied Bell summary judgment on Pearce’s libel claim.562  The case even-
tually went to trial, where Bell and the Hutton Group prevailed.563
552. Id. at 1503–06.
553. Id. at 1503.
554. Id.
555. Id. at 1504.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 1493, 1504.
558. Id. at 1504.
559. Id. at 1506.
560. Id. at 1505.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 1519.
563. Schallert & Williams, supra note 477, at 322.
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C. Recommendations for Lawyers
Lawyers should consider several steps to minimize their potential ex-
posure to defamation claims.  First, lawyers should not rush investigations;
they should take the time necessary to collect and review potentially rele-
vant documents, interview material witnesses and reasonably pursue leads
they provide, verify facts and sources of information, vet material wit-
nesses, understand the context and environment in which the alleged mis-
conduct occurred, and so on.  In summary, they should ensure that the
investigation is adequate.  By doing so, they increase the probability that
any factual statements in a report will be true.
Second, lawyers should qualify statements in a report of an investiga-
tion as necessary.  Lawyers should appropriately include cautionary lan-
guage in the report signaling that particular statements are opinions
rather than expressions of fact.564
Third, although couching statements in a report of an investigation as
opinions is not guaranteed to repel defamation claims, it is a helpful and
often successful defensive measure.565  Lawyers can further minimize po-
tential risk by accurately detailing the factual bases for their conclusions.
Fourth, lawyers should avoid caustic, hyperbolic, or inflammatory lan-
guage in their reports.566
Fifth, lawyers should not publish reports they prepare beyond deliver-
ing them to the client or, in appropriate cases, sharing them with the gov-
ernment.567  Excessive or unnecessary publication of a report potentially
negates qualified privileges that might otherwise attach to allegedly defam-
atory content.568  The denial of summary judgment for the defense in
Pearce brightly highlights the risk posed by excessive or unnecessary publi-
cation of an investigative report.569
Sixth, if it is feasible from a business perspective, lawyers may wish to
consider including an indemnification provision in their engagement let-
ters.570  After all, the cost of defending a defamation action can be signifi-
cant.571  As long as the provision does not purport to prospectively limit
564. Id. at 329; see, e.g., Turner v. Wells, 879 F.3d 1254, 1262–65 (11th Cir.
2018) (rejecting a defamation claim against an investigating lawyer and his law
firm where the offending conclusions in the firm’s report were statements of opin-
ion and were prefaced by cautionary language indicating that they were opinions).
565. See, e.g., Turner, 879 F.3d at 1264–65 (finding for a lawyer and law firm on
the plaintiff’s defamation claim where offending statements in the investigatory
report were accurately identified as opinions).
566. Schallert & Williams, supra note 477, at 330.
567. Id.
568. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 483, § 550, at 265–66.
569. See Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1504–06 (D.D.C.
1987) (rejecting Bell’s qualified privilege defense).
570. See Schallert & Williams, supra note 477, at 329 (recommending that in-
vestigating lawyers “consider including an indemnification clause within the en-
gagement contract”).
571. Id.
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the lawyer’s potential malpractice liability to the client, there is no ethical
impediment to the practice.572
VII. CONDUCTING AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION ON BEHALF OF A
CURRENT CLIENT
Finally, lawyers must carefully consider whether they should conduct
an internal investigation for a current client.  There are good reasons for
organizations to ask their regular outside law firms to conduct internal
investigations.  Among other things, lawyers in those firms are likely to
best understand the organizations’ activities or business, and to know es-
sential personnel.  That familiarity should breed efficiency and
effectiveness.
On the other side of the coin, an argument can be made that the
same familiarity will cause investigating lawyers to gloss over problems or
spare criticism.  If the client is a financially significant one for the firm, the
lawyers arguably may fear that a rigorous investigation will jeopardize their
business relationship and accordingly opt for what critics and adversaries
in subsequent litigation will call a whitewash.573  This is especially true
where the alleged wrongdoing involves the organization’s directors, of-
ficers, or senior management.  In addition, if an investigation may impli-
cate advice previously given to the client by other lawyers in the firm, the
investigating lawyers may have a conflict of interest.574  For these reasons,
prosecutors and regulators often cast a wary eye on investigations con-
ducted by an organization’s regular outside counsel.575
There is no uniformly right answer to the question of whether an or-
ganization’s regular outside counsel should investigate alleged malfea-
sance within the organization.  The answer may depend on the nature of
572. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(h)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(providing that a lawyer shall not “make an agreement prospectively limiting the
lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently repre-
sented in making the agreement”).
573. See generally Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Recommended Practices for Companies
and Their Counsel in Conducting Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83
(2009) (observing that in recent years, prosecutors, government regulators, and
independent auditors “have looked askance at the choice of regular outside corpo-
rate counsel” to conduct internal investigations “based on the fear that regular
corporate counsel may have a motive to avoid criticizing, and thus alienating, se-
nior management, who are possibly a source of sizeable past and future law firm
revenues”).
574. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(stating a concurrent conflict of interest exists where there is a significant risk that
a client’s representation will be materially limited by a personal interest of the
lawyer); id. r. 1.10(a) (imputing conflicts of interest within a law firm).
575. See Wagner & Sandifur, supra note 5, at 41 (asserting that prosecutors
and regulators “take a dim view of internal investigations performed by a corpora-
tion’s regular counsel, especially when the allegations involve the regular counsel’s
previous legal advice or when the regular counsel might be viewed as beholden to
the directors or officers under investigation”).
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the suspected misconduct, the identities of possible wrongdoers, the ad-
vice previously given to the client by lawyers in the firm, and whether the
investigation has possible criminal or regulatory implications, among
other factors.  The point here is simply that lawyers cannot overlook this
question.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Organizations of all types engage law firms to conduct internal investi-
gations into a wide range of alleged misconduct.  For law firms, internal
investigations are a lucrative practice area and the publicity that such in-
vestigations sometimes attract has broad marketing value.  Indeed, inter-
nal investigations are now big business for law firms.  Leading law firms
compete for these potentially lucrative representations.  But as with all
substantive practice areas, internal investigations carry professional liabil-
ity and responsibility risks.  So long as lawyers understand those risks they
can prudently manage them.  This article is intended to be a small step in
that direction.
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